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This dissertation consists of three essays on health economics. The first chapter evaluates
the impacts of and behavioral responses to cost-sharing in population-based public cancer
screening using Korea’s National Cancer Screening Program (NCSP), which provides free
stomach and breast cancer screenings to those below the insurance contribution cutoff. Free
cancer screening substantially increases the cancer screening take up rate, yielding more
cancer detections. Nevertheless, the program was unsuccessful along other key dimensions.
First, the initial increase in cancer detections was quickly crowded out by the decrease in
cancer detections through other channels, such as private screening and diagnostic testing.
Second, those who were induced to take up cancer screening by the cash incentive (compliers)
were relatively healthy. These compliers’ baseline cancer prevalence is as high as those who
take up screening regardless of the availability of free cancer screening (always takers). Those
who do not undergo screening regardless of the availability of free cancer screening (never
takers) had the highest cancer mortalities, and thus stood to benefit the most from the
screening they did not receive. Taken together, free public cancer screening has a limited
impact on cancer- and all-cause mortalities. This analysis demonstrates that even when
take up is significantly responsive, population based cancer screening can be ineffective due
to the behavioral responses to cancer screening such as crowd out and self-selection. More
broadly, my study suggests that the impact of health programs, even when they display
large participation responses, crucially depend upon the potential behavioral responses of
the agents involved.
The second chapter provides empirical evidence on the impacts of government reimburse-
ment of long-term care. We apply a regression discontinuity design using administrative data
from South Korea to estimate the impact of subsidies for formal home and institutional care
on informal care use and medical expenditures. These subsidies lead to increases in formal
long-term care utilization, even accounting for crowd out of private spending. Our main
finding is that the benefits of home and facility care are heterogeneous across physical func-
tion level and therefore setting policy accordingly has the potential to dramatically reduce
medical expenses. We also find that formal long-term care is not a strong substitute for
informal long-term care at the extensive margin. Specifically, among individuals who are
partially dependent for some activities of daily living (ADLs), we find that increased use
of formal home care has no impact on the use of informal care at the extensive margin or
on medical expenses. Among individuals who are partially dependent for several ADLs, we
find that increased use of institutional care leads to reductions in informal care and medical
expenses. From a policy perspective, these results suggest that publicly financed long-term
care may have limited impact among the more able, and that home care may be both more
cost effective and beneficial than institutional care for the least able.
The third chapter provides empirical evidence on both outcomes and potential mech-
anisms resulting from information obtained from health screening. We apply a regression
discontinuity design using administrative data from South Korea to estimate the impact of
different classifications of overall health that vary discontinuously with blood sugar level.
We find that “disease suspected” classification leads to increase clinic visit for the secondary
examinations and future screening take-ups, and decrease of outpatient days and medical
expenditure, however few impacts on health outcomes such as future blood sugar level and
mortality. We also find that the responsiveness to the classifications among the highest
income quintiles is lower than among the other quintiles, consistent with more educated
individuals incorporating information directly from the blood sugar measure itself.
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Public Cancer Screening: Impact and
Behavioral Responses
21.1 Introduction
Cancer screening, a testing for cancer in the absence of symptoms, is often thought to play
a central role in the fight against cancer.1 For example, Cutler (2008) argued that cancer
screening is the most important factor in explaining the recent cancer mortality reduction in
the US. The stakes surrounding cancer screening are large. In 2008, there were 12.4 million
new cancer diagnoses and 7.6 million deaths (13% of total deaths).2 The US spends $10 to
$15 billion annually on cancer screening; Korea spends around $400 million for public cancer
screening (NCI (2007), NCC (2009)).
Despite its popularity, the effect of cancer screening is surprisingly poorly understood.
Evidence on cancer screening from RCTs has been increasing in the last few years,3 but
evidence on population-based cancer screening is still extremely rare even though the effect
of population-based cancer screening might differ from that in RCTs (Kadiyala and Strumpf
(2011)). For example, the take-up rate in RCTs is close to 100%, which is far higher than
in the population setting. If population-based cancer screening (unwittingly) encourages
specific groups of people to take up screening, the effect on these selected people might
differ from an experimental setting. The take-up rates in a population-based breast cancer
screening program were 55.2%, 67.0%, and 73.8% in Korea, the US, and the UK, respectively
1It is distinguished from the diagnostic testing that people undergo to detect cancer in the presence of
relevant symptoms based on a doctor’s recommendation.
2Cancers are the second leading cause of death in developed countries and one of the three leading causes
of death for adults in developing countries. In terms of mortality, lung cancer is the most common cause of
death (1.31 million deaths), followed by stomach (780,000), liver(699,000), colorectal (610,000), and breast
(460,000) cancer (Boyle and Levin (2008))
3Mammography for breast cancer and fecal occult blood test (FOBT) for colorectal cancer were the only
screenings with evidence from RCTs before 2008. Recently, RCTs on the PSA test for prostate cancer
(Andriole et al. (2009), Schro¨der et al. (2009)), low dose computed tomography (CT) (Gross (2011)) and
chest X-ray (Oken et al. (2011)) for lung cancer, and sigmoidoscopy (Atkin et al. (2010)) and colonoscopy
(Zauber et al. (2012)) for colorectal cancer have been published.
3(NCC (2009), NCI (2007), NHS (2008)).4
Moreover, at the time of past RCTs, cancer screening was not as popular as it is today.
This means that a provision of cancer screening today could be crowded out more easily by
outside options. Conceptually, the increase in cancer detections by cancer screening should be
expected to erode completely over time. This erosion is predicted from the stylized framework
where cancer is eventually detected sometime before death (e.g., through diagnostic testing)
and screening per se does not cause cancer. Therefore, the actual effectiveness of cancer
screening on health outcomes would depend upon the difference between the timing of cancer
detection by screening and that of detection without screening. If cancer detection is quickly
crowded out by diagnostic testing, for example, screening would be ineffective. Previous
analyses have often ignored both the erosion prediction and the important interplay between
initial screening and subsequent testing and detection. Sustained “effects” of screening on
cancer detection may be an artifact of endogenous coding, where deaths with but not from
cancer are seen to respond (Black, Haggstrom, and Welch, 2002).
In this paper, I evaluate the impacts of and behavioral responses to cost-sharing in
population-based public stomach and breast cancer screenings. I use a regression disconti-
nuity (hereafter RD) design that takes advantage of the National Cancer Screening Program
(NCSP) in Korea, which provides free cancer screening to those under the insurance con-
tribution cutoff and charges a 50% copayment to those above.5 I investigate a dynamic
aspect of cancer detections through various channels by utilizing data covering the all cancer
4Interestingly, even evidence from RCTs is mixed and controversial. For example, four out of the eight
RCT studies on breast cancer screening reported breast cancer mortality reductions, while the other four
reported no impact. Furthermore, only three out of eight studies were adequately randomized, and no
adequately randomized study showed a reduction in breast cancer mortality (Schopper and de Wolf (2009)).
Evidence on prostate cancer is also mixed. One in the US found no prostate cancer mortality reduction
(Andriole et al. (2009)), while a European study found a 20% prostate cancer mortality reduction (Schro¨der
et al. (2009)).
5Insurance contribution is a fixed percentage of basic salary for those with employee insurance.
4detections regardless of detection channels. Furthermore, I explore the characteristics and
cancer mortality of those induced to take up cancer screening by the program (compliers).
Specifically, I compare them to other sub-populations such as those who take up screening
regardless of the availability of free cancer screening (always takers) and those who do not
take up screening regardless of the availability of free cancer screening (never takers) to shed
light on why population-based estimates may depart from RCTs.
I reach two conclusions. First, I find that cancer screening take up increases by around
10 percentage points - more than doubling - when the price of cancer screening decreases
from 50% copayment to zero. This also results in significantly more detections in the short-
run. However, this detection bump quickly erodes over time through decreases in cancer
detections via other channels such as private screening and diagnostic testing. This finding
means that public cancer screenings were provided to those who would have taken testing
through other channels of cancer detection. Second, I find that there is no difference in
baseline cancer prevalence between compliers and always-takers. Moreover, I find that never
takers are significantly less healthy compared to compliers and always takers in terms of
cancer mortality. This finding implies that the population-based public cancer screening
provision did not reach people more in need of cancer screening during the study period.
Taken together, despite its large effect on screening take up and initial increase in cancer
detections, subsidizing cancer screening had a limited impact on cancer- and all-cause mor-
talities up to 6 years after cancer screening because of behavioral responses such as crowd
out and selection. My results also imply that the finding from RCTs might be quite different
from that in population-based programs due to behavioral responses. To be more successful,
cancer screening programs should promote a sufficiently high take up rate in order to reach
people in need of cancer screening. Given that cancer screening is already popular, addi-
tional provision of cancer screening should be considered with care because such screening
can be easily crowded out.
5The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the previous
literature and contribution of my study. Section 3 explains the institutional details. Section
4 describes the data and presents the descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows the estimation
strategy. Section 6 presents the results. Finally section 7 provides the conclusions.
1.2 Contribution to Literature
This study contributes to the understanding of the causal effect of population-based cancer
screening. Evidence on population-based cancer screening is extremely limited not only due
to scarcity of exogenous variation in cancer screening take up but also due to lack of data.
Access to population level data with information on cancer screening take up, cancer detec-
tions, and related outcomes for long term periods is extremely limited. An exception to this
is Kadiyala and Strumpf (2011) who find that U.S. guidelines that recommend screening for
breast and colorectal screening starting at age 40 and 50, respectively, generate discontinu-
ous increases in screening rates that result in significant increases in early cancer detection
at these ages.
This study has several distinct advantages that improve upon the previous literature.
First, it provides reliable estimates on the causal effect of cancer screening by using plau-
sibly exogenous variation in access to cancer screening. Current evidence on the causal
effect is limited because the take up of cancer screening is associated with omitted variables
(e.g., health-seeking behavior and genetic background) that are also related to health out-
comes. I employ an RD design around insurance contribution cutoffs that determine free
cancer screening eligibility. This design allows comparison across people with very similar
characteristics but sharply different cost-sharing, and thus cancer screening take up rates.
Second, this study finds evidence from a nationwide population-based cancer screening
program. This setting provides a unique opportunity to examine selection to screening
6effects on various outcomes by exploring characteristics of compliers, always takers, and
never takers. This selection can be a reason why effects in experimental settings differ from
that in population-based cancer screening.
Third, taking advantage of a large administrative panel dataset covering all cancer de-
tections, this study presents evidence on a dynamic aspect of cancer detections in response
to a free public cancer screening offer. I measure not only the increase in cancer detections
by public cancer screening, but also the crowd out of cancer detections by other channels
over time. The unique setting of a public cancer screening program allows me to evaluate
the dynamic feature of cancer detections through various channels. Especially, the crowd
out could be timing and setting specific, which could be, at least partially, the reason for the
mixed findings in the previous RCT literature.
This study also contributes to the understanding of the impact of cost-sharing of pre-
ventive health services. Cost-sharing is a double-edged sword; charging a non-zero price for
health services could improve effectiveness by curbing unnecessary demand, but it may also
reduce necessary demand, which could lead to worse health outcomes and higher medical ex-
penditures in the future (selection effect). For example, Goldman, Joyce, and Zheng (2007)
show that cost-sharing might reduce treatment compliance, which could lead to worse health
outcomes and higher future medical expenditures.
In the context of preventive health care, the existence of a selection effect has not been
made clear since individuals often are not aware of how much preventive health care they
need. For this reason, price sensitivity in preventive health care is potentially different from
other therapeutic health care. However, there is remarkably little evidence on the effects of
cost-sharing in preventive health care. One of the few exceptions is evidence by Cohen and
Dupas (2010), which shows that cost-sharing of insecticide-treated nets (ITN)s for malaria
prevention decreases demand without inducing selection of people who are more vulnerable.
Baicker and Goldman (2011) explain that the overall cost-sharing effects consist of the
7own-price effect, the cross-price effect, and the effect on health. As many studies have
already shown, the demand for health care decreases due to cost-sharing (Newhouse et al.
(1981), Manning et al. (1987), Newhouse and Group (1993), Hsu et al. (2006), Chandra,
Gruber, and McKnight (2010)). In addition, a change in the price of a particular health care
service may affect demand not only for that health service but also for a complementary or
substitutable service. For example, Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010) found “offset
effects”, specifically an increase in hospitalization in response to higher cost-sharing for
outpatient or pharmaceutical use in Medicare. Lastly, the previous literature has found that
greater utilization of health care is not related with better health outcomes for the average
population (Manning et al. (1987), Wennberg and Cooper (1996)), but rather an increased
cost-sharing is associated with adverse health outcomes for the vulnerable population (Swartz
(2010)). Despite these findings, the evidence on the effect of cost-sharing on health is still
scarce overall.
In the context of public cancer screening, I explore how much cost-sharing decreases
demand for public cancer screening (own-price effect). In addition, I examine whether cost-
sharing in cancer screening invites people who are more likely to have cancer to the screening,
or just reduces screening take up without increasing the detection rate (selection effect). I
also check whether changes in public cancer screening take up are crowded out by other
sources of cancer detections such as private screening and diagnostic testing (cross price
effect). Finally, I evaluate whether changes in public cancer screening take up have an
impact on health outcomes (effect on health).
81.3 The National Cancer Screening Program (NCSP)
in Korea
Korea provides universal health insurance coverage through the National Health Insurance
(NHI) and the Medical Care Assistance (MCA). The NHI is available to 95% of the total
population, and the MCA covers the rest of the population, that is, the poorest 5%. The
National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC), a single insurer, manages both the NHI and
the MCA programs. There are two categories of insurance in the NHI program: employee
and self-employed insurance. Employees and their dependents are eligible for the employee
insurance, and those who are excluded from employee insurance are eligible for self-employed
insurance.6
The financial resources of the NHI system mainly come from insurance contributions
paid by the insured and their employers. The insurance contribution amount is calculated
differently by type of insurance. The contribution rate of the employee insurance, which this
study investigates, is based solely upon a fixed percentage of the basic wage.7
It is important to note that there are three types of resources for cancer detection in
Korea: public cancer screening organized by the NHIC, private opportunistic screening,
and diagnostic testing. The first two are screenings for detecting cancer in the absence of
symptoms, and the last is a clinically recommended procedure when relevant symptoms are
present. Public cancer screening and diagnostic testing are covered by health insurance,
while private opportunistic cancer screening is not.
The NHI operates the National Health Screening Program (NHSP) and the National
6There are 31.4 and 17.2 million people in Korea with employee and self-employed insurance, respectively.
Employee insurance applies to regular employees, but daily wage workers with less than one month of
continuous employment are excluded from this category. Spouses, lineal ascendants and descendants, and
siblings of employees who do not have remunerations or income are dependents of employee insurance.
7The contribution rate was 3.40% in 2001, 3.62% in 2002, and 3.94% in 2003, respectively.
9Cancer Screening Program (NCSP). The NHIC implements a national campaign and sends
letters to households to promote public health and cancer screenings. The NHSP provides a
general health screening, including measurement of Body Mass Index (BMI), blood pressure,
blood sugar level, and cholesterol. The NCSP provides cancer screenings. Both programs
offer screenings every two years. People born in even/odd-numbered years are strongly
encouraged to undertake screenings in an even/odd-numbered year, but those who missed
the offer are allowed to undertake screenings in the next year.
Table 1.1 summarizes the NCSP. The NCSP for NHI beneficiaries started in 2002 with
stomach, breast, and cervical cancer screenings (Kim et al. (2011)).8 An upper gastrointesti-
nal (UGI) series, which is a radiologic examination, and an Esophagogastroduodenoscopy
(EGD), which is an endoscopic procedure, are used for stomach cancer screening. Screening
takers are allowed to choose either of them based on their preferences. EGD, a confirmatory
test, is provided to those who received cancer suspicion results from UGI. Mammography is
used for breast cancer screening. The price of stomach and breast screenings were approxi-
mately $38 and $20, respectively, during the study period (Appendix Table A.1). The prices
of public cancer screening and diagnostic testing, both of which are covered by the NHI, are
the same, and private screening is more expensive.
The NCSP offers subsidized cancer screenings. The amount of the subsidy is determined
by age and insurance contribution amount. Health and cervical cancer screenings are free
of charge for people satisfying the age criteria regardless of insurance contribution amount.
However, free stomach, breast, and liver cancer screenings are available to those satisfying
both the age and insurance contribution criteria shown in Table 1.1.9 The age cutoff is 40
8The NCSP for MCA recipients began in 1999. I limit my sample to only NHI beneficiaries since MCA
beneficiaries are also eligible for other social programs such as the National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS)
program.
9Liver cancer screenings were introduced in 2003. Liver cancer screening is not a mass screening because
it is offered to people with chronic liver disease who account for less than 1% of the population. Moreover, the
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years old for stomach and breast cancer screenings. A 50% copayment is applied to those
who satisfy the age criteria but not the insurance contribution criteria. The maximum cash
incentive is $19 (=50%×$38) in males and $29 (=50%×($38+$20)) in females, respectively.
Insurance contribution cutoffs are updated every year based on the government budget sit-
uation. During the study period, free cancer screening is available to those with around the
lowest 30% of income.10 The cutoff insurance contribution for employee type insurance was
26,180 and 24,630 Korean Won (KRW) in 2002 and 2003, respectively.
The identification strategy of this study is to compare people just below and above
insurance contribution cutoffs among those who satisfy the age criteria. Specifically, the
causal effect of stomach cancer screening in males can be estimated by comparing people
just below and above the cutoffs. Not a single cancer screening effect can be isolated in




The primary analysis relies on the NHI data for those with employee insurance for the years
2001-2008.11 My empirical analysis requires data on the running variable, level of insurance
contribution; indicator for take up of cancer screening; and relevant intermediate and final
cutoff for liver cancer screening in 2003 was 16,750 Korean Won (KRW), far enough from those of stomach
and breast cancer screenings.
10Basic salary level (without including allowance, bonuses, and incentives) around the cutoff was $713,
and annual medical expenditure is $702 and $774 in males and females, respectively. Therefore, the $19 -
$29 cash incentive for cancer screening is not large.
11The data is longitudinal in nature but not a perfectly balanced panel because of deaths and drop outs
from the NHI (i.e., becoming an MCA recipient).
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outcome variables explaining the effect of and behavioral responses to cancer screening.
The NHI data consists of three parts: eligibility, medical records, and screening.12 The
eligibility component contains basic demographic information such as gender, age, type of
insurance, and monthly insurance contribution. Mortality (without cause-of-death infor-
mation) is included. Also included is individual and household labor market participation.
Medical records include medical expenditure based on the International Statistical Classifi-
cation of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision (ICD-10), which allows me
to measure cancer detection and treatment. Lastly, the screening data includes information
from health and cancer screenings.
1.4.2 Study Sample
The study sample consists of those with employee-type insurance at the time of screening
offer. Males who were previously diagnosed with stomach cancer are excluded from the
sample, as are females who were previously diagnosed with stomach or breast cancer. In-
surance contribution is the running variable. Specific-year cohort is defined as people with
employee health insurance in a specific year. “Even” and “odd” mean those born in even-
and odd-numbered years, respectively. For example, “2002 even cohort” refers to people
who are aged 40 and over, were born in an even-numbered year, and have employee health
insurance in 2002. The main sample is a stacked-up sample of the 2002 even and 2003
odd cohorts aged 40 and over. Cohorts are stacked up by standardized insurance contri-
bution, which measures how far each individual’s insurance contribution is from the cutoff
(=(Insurance contribution - Cutoff)/Standard deviation).
The outcome variables are cancer detections, cancer mortality, and all-cause mortality.
12The insurance cutoff for free cancer screening is determined based on November of the previous year.
Therefore, I match November eligibility for the years 2000-2007 to the medical records and screening data
of 2001-2008.
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Cancer detections are based on ICD-10 information, which captures all cancers regardless
of detection channels. One concern with using ICD-10 information is over-diagnosis.13 To
prevent misinterpretation, I restrict cancer detections to only if medical expenditure on
cancer in the first year of detection is greater than 300,000KRW (≈$300).14 Alternative
definitions with different restrictions are used for the robustness check: no restriction and
with non-zero medical expenditure on cancer in two or more sequential years.15 Results are
similar across definitions. Cancer detection by public cancer screening is defined as cancer
detection with take up of public cancer screening either in the same or previous year16;
otherwise it is categorized as cancer detection by other channels.17
The final health outcomes are cancer-related and all-cause mortalities. Cancer-related
mortality is defined as death with non-zero medical expenditure on cancer in the last year of
death.18 Cancer-related mortality is potentially a more comprehensive concept than cancer-
specific mortality in that cancer-specific mortality captures death where cancer is a main
cause of death, while cancer-related mortality encompasses death where cancer is a comorbid
13An anecdotal story is that doctors are likely to input the “stomach cancer” ICD-10 code even when
they are still just suspicious of the cancer (i.e., a malignant-looking stomach cancer). This is because it
is preferable to record a more serious disease, as doing so means more procedures can be covered by the
insurance.
14This definition is recommended by the National Cancer Center (NCC) of Korea. According to the
NCC, more than 90-95% of cancer cases meeting this definition is matched with the national cancer registry,
an official record of cancer cases in Korea. Unfortunately, data from the national cancer registry is not
available in this study. The $300 restriction excludes 10.8% and 15.3% of cancer cases in males and females,
respectively
15The two sequential year restriction excludes 27.3% and 33.4% of cancer cases in males and females,
respectively. The two sequential year restriction may exclude early stomach cancer cases that are not
necessary for the subsequent chemo- or radio-therapy. Results are available by request.
16Cancer detected by public screening late in the previous year can be captured in next year.
17Cancer detections with take up of both channels are categorized as detection by public cancer screening.
Public cancer screening take ups might lead to extra take up of diagnostic testing for confirmation, but not
the other way around.
18It also must satisfy the cancer detection restriction that medical expenditure in the first year of cancer
detection is greater than $300.
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condition such as suicide due to depression accompanied by cancer. All-cause mortality
equals to one if an individual died for any reason, and zero otherwise. It is, of course, the
most comprehensive outcome in my analysis.
1.4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the study sample. Panels A to F of Table 1.2
describe the general information, baseline medical expenditure, cancer screening take up,
cumulative cancer incidence, and cumulative mortality. Around 10% of the population took
up cancer screening within the first two years (panel C) and the cumulative screening take
up within 6 years is over 50%. The cumulative stomach cancer incidence (up to 6 years) is
1.3% for males and .5% for females. In terms of mortality, the cumulative all cause mortality
(up to 6 years) is 7.3% for males and 5.7% for females. The cumulative cancer mortality
(also up to 6 years) is 4.7% for males and 4.3% for females.
Panels A, B, and C of Table 1.3 provide the results of the stomach and breast cancer
screenings. Each panel consists of two sub-panels. The first sub-panel presents the statistics
of the entire sample, which includes all individuals regardless of whether they get screened
for cancer or not. The next sub-panel presents statistics by the cancer screening result of
screening takers. Column (1) presents the total number of people in each category, and
column (2) presents the number of cancer detections within two years in each category.
Cancer incidence, the proportion of new cancer cases out of the total number of people, is
presented in column (3). For example, the two-year incidences of stomach cancer in males
and females were 0.44% (=17,447/3,948,584) and 0.19% (=8,482/4,41,1321), respectively.
Table 1.3 reveals four important facts about the efficiency of cancer screening. The first is
that the rate of false negatives is low. As an example, the probability that a screening reports
a stomach cancer-free result even though a patient has cancer is 0.23% for men and 0.06%
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for women.19 The second is that the rate of false positives, the probability that a screening
reports a cancer suspicion for a cancer-free patient, is high. For example, the false positive
rate is 93.53% (=100-6.47%) for stomach cancer screening in males. Such a high false positive
rate is not surprising given that cancer screenings tend to minimize false negatives and
largely tend to ignore false positives. The third is that cancer screening detects other types of
diseases in addition to cancer. For example, stomach cancer screening detects benign diseases
such as gastritis, stomach ulcer, and duodenal ulcer. The fourth is that the total number
of new cancer detections through public cancer screening is low. For example, public cancer
screening detects 749 out of 17,447 stomach cancers in males. Stomach cancer detection
by public cancer screening accounts for only 4.3% of total detections. The corresponding
numbers in female stomach and breast cancers are 3.8%(=320/8,482) and 4.8%(=347/7,299),
respectively.
1.5 Estimation Strategy
1.5.1 Empirical Analysis Setup
I take advantage of the insurance contribution cutoff for free cancer screening eligibility in
order to estimate the effect of cancer screening. This corresponds to the intent-to-treat effect
of offering free cancer screening versus charging a 50% copayment without controlling for any
subsequent take up of cancer screening. I consider the following main regression equation:
Yit = β · 1(Ii > τ) + f(Ii) + ψ + i (1.1)
where Yit is outcomes for an individual i, such as cancer mortality or all cause mortality, t
19In reality, the number of false negative can be smaller than the suggested statistics because new cancer
cases developed after the screenings are included in these statistics.
15
years after the cancer screening offer. 1(·) is an indicator function for whether an individual’s
insurance contribution (I) is greater than or equal to the cutoff, τ , which determines eligibility
for free cancer screening. f(·) is a flexible polynomial function of I. ψ is a cohort fixed
effect and  is an error term. Considering that the distribution of standardized insurance
contribution is not continuous, errors are clustered by the level of the normalized insurance
contribution as suggested by Lee and Card (2008). The analysis is done separately by gender
as different types of cancer screenings are offered based on gender.
The idea behind the RD design is that the discontinuity measured by β measures the
causal effect of cancer screening, if all other factors except cancer screening take up are
smooth around the cutoff. If this assumption holds, people right above and below the cut-off
can serve as proper control and treatment groups, respectively, and therefore any difference
in outcomes, which is captured by β, can be attributed to eligibility for cancer screening.
1.5.2 Bandwidth Selection and Modeling f(Ii)
Bandwidth selection is one of the critical decisions in the RD model. Since there is no
universally accepted convention for how to choose the optimal bandwidth, I try several ways
that have been proposed in the literature. In my analysis, I use a bandwidth of 0.3 as well as
the Imbens-Kalyanarman (IK) optimal bandwidth suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). My preferred bandwidth is 0.3, since it is wide enough not to be too imprecise and
narrow enough to compare observations around the cutoff. Furthermore, I use a rectangular
kernel and the local linear regression method suggested by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw
(2001) for modeling f(Ii).
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1.5.3 Smoothness of Predetermined Characteristics around the
Cutoff
An important assumption of RD design is that individuals just below and just above the
cutoff can be compared with each other. There are several reasons why this assumption might
not hold. One concern might be that those slightly above the cutoff may reduce their income
level in order to become eligible for free cancer screening. However, such manipulation of
income reporting is extremely unlikely. First, the cutoff for the program is decided annually
based on the government budget and the cutoff is not announced in advance.20 Secondly,
it is not likely for people to manipulate their income level in order to get such small cash
incentive.
Appendix Figure A.1 provides a visual illustration of the density of observations by the
standard insurance contribution using the smallest bin size around the cutoff. In addition,
I test for differences in observable characteristics around the cutoff. Appendix Table A.2
presents estimates of the discontinuity around the cutoff for predetermined variables such as
age, general screening take up, employment status, and medical expenditure. Most variables
appear to be continuous around the cutoff.
1.5.4 Compliers, Always Takers, and Never Takers
My analysis estimates the local average treatment effect (LATE) for compliers around the
cutoff. Since compliers are not randomly selected from the population, the impacts of cancer
screening in this study do not necessarily represent that for the average population. More-
over, in my specific case more than 80% of the sample remain never takers during the study
period.
20For example, eligibility for cancer screening in 2002 was decided by the insurance contribution of Novem-
ber 2001, and screening was offered starting in January 2002.
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I propose two different ways to compare the characteristics of compliers, always takers,
and never takers. First, I compare compliers and always takers by restricting the sample
to screening takers. Since everyone has undergone public cancer screening in the restricted
sample, any difference around the cutoff is due to the compositional change of screening
takers around the cutoff. In this sample, those right below the cutoff consist of always
takers and compliers while those right above the cutoff are always takers. Thus, the analysis
with the restricted sample allows me to compare the characteristics of compliers and always
takers. Similarly, I restrict the sample to screening non-takers. This allows me to compare
compliers and never takers.
Another way to compare compliers characteristics is suggested by Almond and Doyle
(2011). Under the assumption that other things are equal around the cutoff, always takers
and never takers are identified at just above and below the cutoff, respectively. Even though
compliers are not identifiable, observable characteristics of compliers can be calculated from






Next, I also define a binary variable S, an indicator for cancer screening take up:
S =
{
0 not take up of cancer screening
1 take up of cancer screening
Lastly, I define SF , as the value S would have if F were either 0 or 1. For example,
E(X|S1 = 1) presents the mean value of screening takers in the eligible group.
To estimate complier characteristics, three conditions are required: the existence of a first
stage, monotonicity and independence. First, the existence of first stage implies that the
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probability of cancer screening take up is higher in the eligible group than in the non-eligible
group. This is empirically testable. Second, the monotonicity assumption implies that S1
> S0 for everyone with probability 1. In other words, anyone who takes cancer screening in
the absence of the cash incentive would also undertakes cancer screening in the presence of
the cash incentive. This is not directly testable since I do not observe S1 and S0, but it is
reasonable to assume monotonicity in my setting. Third, independence implies that S1 and
S0 are independent of F and the potential outcomes. This is not directly testable either, but
it is plausible not only because eligibility is determined by the government ex ante but also
because people are not likely to manipulate income in order to get a small cash incentive.
To see this, the smoothness of the observable characteristics around the cutoff is shown in
section 5.4.
Let’s first consider E(X|S1 = 1). It can be written as:
E(X|S1 = 1) = E(X|S1 = 1, S0 = 1)·P (S0 = 1|S1 = 1)+E(X|S1 = 1, S0 = 0)·P (S0 = 0|S1 = 1)
(1.2)
Equation (1.2) implies that E(X|S1 = 1) is divided by always takers and compliers com-
ponents. E(X|S1 = 1, S0 = 0) represent the characteristics of compliers I am interested in.
E(X|S1 = 1, S0 = 1) = E(X|S0 = 1) holds by the monotonicity assumption. P(S0=1) and
P(S1=0) can be directly measured from the sample. P(S0=1), the proportion of always-
takers, can be measured by piA the proportion of screening takers in the non-eligible group.
Similarly, the proportion of never-takers, P(S1=0) also can be measured by piN , the propor-
tion of screening non-takers in the eligible group. The proportion of compliers (piC) is 1- piA




Finally, by rearranging the components of equation (1.2), the mean characteristics of
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compliers are presented by the terms that can be calculated with the sample:




E(X|S = 1, F = 1)− piA
piC + piA




This section presents the results from equation (1.1). I first explore the effects of cost-sharing
on screening take up and crowd out behaviors. Specifically, I present evidence of discrete
changes in eligibility and a subsequent increase in cancer screening take ups. I then describe
dynamic changes in cancer detections by public as well as other channels. I also explore the
characteristics of compliers, always takers and never takers to explore self-selection. Lastly,
I estimate the causal impacts of the increase in public cancer screening take up on mortality,
and other behavioral responses.
1.6.1 Effect of Cost-sharing on Screening Take Up
I first illustrate that the eligibility for free cancer screening increases from 0 to 1, as shown
in Figure 1.1. I plot the standardized insurance contribution that determines eligibility on
the x-axis, and the outcomes on the y-axis. The solid lines present the fitted values from
equation (1.1) with local linear regression using a 0.3 bandwidth and a rectangular kernel.
The open circles in the figure display the means of the fitted values that are collapsed into
bins containing individuals who are within 0.05 of a standardized insurance contribution.
The vertical difference between two points right below and over the cutoff (vertical line) is
an analog of β in equation (1.1).21 Its regression analog is shown in column (1) of Table 1.4.
Columns (2) to (5) of Table 1.4 show how much eligibility for the cash incentive translates
21Figure 1.1- 1.15 have similar structures where the standardized insurance contribution is plotted on the
x-axis, and the outcome variable on the y-axis and the open circles are the mean of the outcome in each bin.
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into an increase in cancer screening take up. Panels A, B, and C of Table 1.4 show an increase
in male stomach, female stomach, and female breast cancer screening take ups. Columns
(2) and (3) present the cancer screening take up in the first year with bandwidth 0.3 and
IK optimal bandwidth, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) present the cumulative cancer
screening take up until the second year from the screening offer.22 Figure 1.2 corresponds to
column (4) of Table 1.4. As expected, eligible people took up public cancer screening mostly
in the first year. Up to the second year, male stomach, female stomach, and female breast
cancer screening take ups increased by 8.3%, 10.9%, and 10.7% points, respectively. This
corresponds to an 83.6, 86.9, and 84.4 percent increase.23
The estimated arc-elasticities of demand is around -0.47.24 The estimated arc elasticity
is close to the elasticity of preventive health products in developing countries, such as -0.6
for chlorine, a disinfectant that prevents water-borne diseases in Zambia (Ashraf, Berry, and
Shapiro (2010)), and -0.37 for ITNs for malaria prevention in Kenya (Cohen and Dupas
(2010)). On the other hand, it is much bigger than the elasticity in therapeutic care in
developed countries, such as -0.07 to -0.21 for ambulatory utilization in Korea (Kim, Ko,
and Yang (2005)), around -0.2 for health care for the non-elderly in the US (Newhouse
and Group (1993)), -0.10 for clinic visits for the elderly in the US(Chandra, Gruber, and
McKnight (2010)), and -0.15 to -0.17 for the elderly in Japan (Shigeoka (2011)).
Next, I examine the impact of past public cancer screening take up on future public
22Remember that people born in even/odd-numbered years are strongly encouraged to take cancer screen-
ing in an even/odd-numbered year, but those who missed the offer are allowed to take up the screening in
the next year. Therefore, the offer is actually valid for two years.
23Percentage increase is calculated by the formula AB , where A is a the β from equation (1.1), and B is the
mean of predicted value at just below and above the cutoff from the local linear regression with bandwidth
0.3
24The arc-elasticities are calculated as ((Q2−Q1)/(Q1 +Q2)/2)/((P2−P1)/(P1 +P2)/2). Comparing the
arc-elasticity in a zero price setting to those in other settings could be problematic because the denominator,
(P2 − P1)/(P1 + P2)/2, is always 2 if P1=0. Moreover, people treat a zero price as not only a decrease of
cost but also as an extra benefit (Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely (2007)). This must be interpreted with
this caveat.
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cancer screening take up. If past and future cancer screenings are substitutes, future public
cancer screening take up would decrease. On the other hand, if they are complements,
future cancer screening take ups would increase. I first check whether there is a change
in eligibility for future free public cancer screening. Unless the free cancer screening offer
influences future wage levels (and thus insurance contribution), the eligibility for future
cancer screening should be smooth around the cutoff. Figure 1.3 and columns (6) and (7) of
Table 1.4 confirm the limited change in future eligibility.25 I find no impact on future public
cancer screening take ups as shown in columns (8) and (9) of Table 1.4 and Figure 1.4.
In sum, free cancer screening increased the demand for public cancer screening dramati-
cally and take up of previous public cancer screening does not influence future take up.
1.6.2 Effect on Cancer Detections: Dynamic Aspect of Cancer
Detections
In this section, I study whether public cancer screening actually promotes cancer detections,
and explore whether the increased cancer detections diminish over time. As mentioned
before, if cancers are eventually detected before death, the initial increase in cancer detections
by the cancer screening program should be crowded out over time by other channels such as
diagnostic testing. Therefore, while the crowd out by private cancer screening or diagnostic
testing is expected, what is important is the time it takes for the crowd out to occur. The
effect of cancer screening would depend upon the difference between the timing of cancer
detection by screening and that of detection without screening.26
25The dependent variable is a summation of eligibility between years 3 and 6. Since the screening is offered
every two years, it ranges between 0 and 2.
26It is worth mentioning that cancer detections (and medical expenditures) are observed only if individuals
are under the NHI. It is important to address the concern of systematic sample selection by dropping out of
the NHI, which could account for my finding. Therefore, whether public cancer screening had any impact
on eligibility for the NHI is another relevant outcome. To check this possibility, I look at the NHI status
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Table 1.5, Table 1.6, and Table 1.7 present the dynamic change of cumulative stomach
cancer detections in males, stomach cancer in females, and breast cancer in females, respec-
tively. Panels A, B, and C in each table present cumulative cancer detections by public
cancer screening and by other channels, and overall cumulative detections. Overall detec-
tion is the summation of detection by public cancer screening and other channels. Columns
(1) to (6) show cumulative cancer detections over a six year period. Columns (7) and (8)
present cumulative cancer detections between 3 and 6 years after the cancer screening offer.
Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 are analogs of columns (2) and (7) in each table.
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 reveal that impacts on stomach cancer detections are similar for
males and females. First, stomach cancer detections by public cancer screening significantly
increases by 0.045% points for males (a 30.3% increase) and 0.022% points for females (a
36.0% increase) up to the second year of the screening offer (panel A). Second, cancer
detections by other channels decrease as well (i.e., crowd out). As a result, overall cancer
detections in males and females increase by 0.020% points (an 8.8% change) and 0.018%
points (a 4.4% change) in the first year of the screening offer, but both decrease to zero
within a year (panel C). The time it takes for the crowd out to occur is no more than a year.
I also find similar result from breast cancer screening (Table 1.7). To summary, increased
cancer detections by free public cancer screening were quickly crowded out, less than one
year, by other channels including private screening and diagnostic testing.
1.6.3 Stage at Which Cancer is Detected
In order to be effective the screening should find the cancer at the earlier stages, but detecting
cancer early does not necessarily mean detecting it at the earlier stages. If the target cancer
grows slowly, for example, thyroid cancer, the difference in timing in cancer detections would
directly. I find no statistically significant difference in the NHI status.
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not translate to detection at the earlier stages.27 The question, then, is whether this short
advance in timing of cancer detection translates into cancer detection at the earlier stage.
In this section, I explore whether the difference in the timing of cancer detection I find in
section 6.2 actually translated into cancer detection at the earlier stages.
The dependent variable that I use is the amount of medical expenditure in the first year
of cancer detection. I believe that it is a good proxy for the stage of the cancer because it
reflects the intensity of cancer treatment. Higher medical expenditures may imply a more
advanced cancer stage. However, given the low incidence of cancer, the sample for which
medical expenditure in the first year of cancer detection could be measured is much smaller
than the initial sample,28 and this might limit the precision of the estimates.
Figure 1.7 provides a graphical illustration of the level of medical expenditure in the first
year of stomach and breast cancer detection during the first two years (panel A) as well as
between 3 to 6 years after the screening offer (panel B). Table 1.8 is the regression analog. I
find no evidence on stomach and breast cancer detection at the earlier stages. This suggests
that cancer detection one year early did not actually translate to cancer detection at the
earlier stages.
1.6.4 Selection to Cancer Screening
Selection Effect by Cost-Sharing
I examine whether cost-sharing in cancer screening changes the types of testers. To do
so, I compare compliers and always takers by restricting the sample to screening takers as
27Moreover, if the target cancer is too malignant, for example, pancreatic cancer, screening could detect
cancer at the earlier stage but doing so might not translate to mortality reduction because earlier intervention
is less likely to be successful.
28Even though stomach and breast cancers are one of the most common cancers in Korea, the annual
incidence for people aged 40 and over is no greater than 0.5%
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suggested in section 5.3. Table 1.9, Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9 illustrate the cancer screening
results and cancer detections among screening takers. Panels A, B, and C of Figure 1.8
present the probabilities of having normal results, cancer suspicion results, and results for
other diseases, respectively. They show that compared to always takers, compliers are more
likely to have normal results (panel A), less likely to have cancer suspicion results (panel B,
female stomach cancer), and less likely to have results for other diseases. Always takers are
actually are more likely to have symptoms than compliers.
However, these relationships do not apply to stomach and breast cancers: I find no
difference in cancer detections between compliers and always takers. This implies that the
baseline health status of compliers in terms of cancer prevalence is as good as that of always
takers. From a different perspective, it also implies that cost-sharing reduces the demand
for cancer screening without increasing the efficiency of cancer detection.29
Characteristics of Compliers, Always Takers, and Never Takers
As mentioned above, the effects I measure stem from compliers. Since compliers are not
randomly selected from the sample, understanding the characteristics of compliers, always
takers, and never takers is important. Table 1.10 presents summary statistics of the entire
sample for bandwidth [-0.3,0.3], compliers, always takers in bandwidth [0,0.3], and never
takers in bandwidth [-0.3,0]. As explained in section 5.3, the characteristics of compliers can
be estimated with the proportion of always takers (piA) and never takers (piN), as well as the
average characteristics of always takers (E(X|S = 1, F = 0)), and eligible screening takers
((X|S = 1, F = 1)). The estimated proportions of compliers, always takers, and never takers
are presented in panel A1, B1, and C1 of Table 1.10. The proportion of compliers is between
29This finding is similar to the result that cost-sharing of ITNs for malaria prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa
decreases the demand without inducing a selection of people who actually need the ITNs more (Cohen and
Dupas (2010)).
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9% to 12%, and more than 80% of the sample remained never takers.
I find that never takers, those who did not undergo public cancer screenings even with
a cash incentive, are significantly different from compliers and always takers. In contrast
to the belief that people with higher risk are more likely to utilize medical services, never
takers in cancer screening have the highest risk in terms of cancer mortality. Even though
the 6-year cumulative stomach cancer detection rate is lowest among never takers (with
always takers at 1.7%, compliers at 1.5%, and never takers at 1.3%)30, the 6-year cumulative
stomach cancer mortality is highest among males in this group (with always takers at 0.24%,
compliers at 0.34%, and never takers at 0.54%).31 In female stomach and breast cancers, the
6-year cumulative cancer mortality in never takers is much greater than that in compliers
and always takers.
Appendix Figure A.2 illustrates that cancer screening take up is negatively correlated
with health status, which in turn might also be related to cancer incidence and mortality.
This finding implies that public cancer screening did not reach people who needed cancer
screening the most during the study period. This potentially explains why, as described in
a later section, I find no evidence of reductions in mortality.
Figure 1.10 illustrates another aspect of the characteristics of compliers, always takers,
and never takers. Panel A compares compliers with always takers by using the sample of
screening takers, and panel B compares compliers with never takers by using the sample
of screening non-takers. Table 1.11 is its regression analog. It is important to note that
panels A and B compare compliers with always takers and never takers indirectly because
compliers are not identifiable. For example, I compare never-takers right below the cutoff
30Low detection among never-takers does not mean that cancer prevalence is lowest among never-takers.
Further, never-takers are not diagnosed with cancer through public cancer screenings but through other
channels or future public screening.
31Since I exclude previous cancer patients from the study sample, the cancer mortality that I measure is
death from cancer that developed after the screening offer.
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with the combined sample of 5.6%(= 5.1/(85.3 + 5.1)) compliers and 94.4% never-takers
right below the cutoff in male stomach cancer screening. Even though the power of the
test significantly decreases, I find a significant difference in female breast cancer screening
mortality between non-takers and compliers. This result confirms that non-takers have the
highest breast cancer mortality.
1.6.5 Effect on Health Behaviors: Health Screening and Medical
Expenditure
I also explore additional behavioral responses: future general health screening and medical
expenditure. Take up of free general health screening, which is offered every two years,
is shown in Figure 1.11 and columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.12. The results indicate no
significant impact on general health screening take up. I also evaluate the impact on medical
expenditure, as shown in Figure 1.12 and columns (3) to (8) of Table 1.12. To increase
precision, I use the differences in medical expenditure from baseline medical expenditure as
dependent variables. I find no significant change in medical expenditure.
1.6.6 Effect on Health Outcomes: Bio-markers and Mortality
First, I explore intermediate health outcomes such as the probability of being obese, blood
sugar level (Diabetes Mellitus (DM) indicator), and total cholesterol level (hyperlipidemia
indicator).32 Table 1.13 reveals no evidence of a change in intermediate health outcomes.33
Finally, I explore the impact on a number of mortality measures. Figure 1.15 presents
32I additionally have results for blood pressure, γGTP, and hemoglobin level. I find no change in these
outcomes. These results are available by request.
33Intermediate health outcomes can be measured only for the general health screening takers. It is possible
that this selection is a source of bias. Appendix Figure A.3 reveals that screening takers are more likely to
have better health status (upward bias). Thus, the coefficient estimates on intermediate health outcomes
would be upper bound.
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the average effect on cancer-, non-cancer-, and all-cause mortalities, respectively. Table 1.14
presents the corresponding estimates of β from equation (1.1). I do not find evidence of
an effect on stomach and breast cancer mortalities. This is not a surprise at all given that
cancer screening has a limited impact on the stage at which cancer is detected. I do not
find any statistically significant changes in all-cause mortality either. Figure 1.16 illustrates
a changing trend in mortalities over time. Even though none of the estimates is statistically
significant, it presents a decreasing pattern in males and an increasing pattern in females,
suggesting that 6 years could be too short to measure mortality outcomes.
1.6.7 False Positive
Behavioral responses to cancer screening might differ by screening result. Especially, be-
havioral responses for those with false positive results are of a particular interest. To see
this, I implement another RD regression with the additional interaction terms of eligibility
and screening result. Screening result is categorized as result of “normal”,“cancer detec-
tion”,“false positive”, and “other type of diseases”. Cancer detection is the case when an
individual is diagnosed with cancer after receiving a cancer suspicious result; otherwise it is
categorized as a false positive. I construct an additional RD model in the following way:
Yit = β · 1(Ii > τ) + δ · 1(Ii > τ) ·
∑
Ri + η ·
∑
Ri + f(Ii) + γXi + i
where R is a dummy for the four types of cancer screening results. Since the cancer
screening results are endogenous, results of this analysis need to be interpreted with care.
The results are presented in Table 1.15. Columns (1) and (2) show that males with false
positive result from stomach cancer screening are more likely to take health and stomach
cancer screenings in the future. Columns (6) to (8) show that females with false positive
result from breast cancer screening are more likely to take stomach and breast cancer screen-
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ings in the future. I find no significant change in medical expenditure both for males and
females with false positive result. It implies that false positives only induce additional clinic
visits and procedures, which are covered by the public cancer screening program.
1.6.8 Cost Analysis
This section presents estimates of the cost-effectiveness of the program, in terms of cancer
detection, from a societal perspective.34 Panels A, B, and C of Table 1.16 present calcula-
tions of the cost per cancer detected for male stomach, female stomach, and breast cancer
screenings. Column (1) shows the number of screenings, travel days, and lost work days per
cancer detected. Column (2) indicates the corresponding unit costs.35 Column (3) presents
the total cost of each category, and column (4), the proportion of that categorys cost to the
overall cost. The overall cost of each cancer screening is the sum of direct screening costs,
transportation costs, and opportunity costs.
Those who were induced to screen by the program are compliers. Accordingly, the num-
bers and costs presented in columns (1) and (2) are determined from equation (1.3). These
are further weighted by the proportion of compliers in 2002 and 2003.36 Medical expendi-
tures induced by false positives and cancer detections are not included since there are no
significant impacts as shown in columns (5) and (11) of Table 1.15.
I first consider the direct screening cost. Since individual level biopsy data are not avail-
able, I use the average biopsy rate in 2002 and 2003, and assume that it is constant around
34There is no “benefit” in terms of mortality since I do not find change in cancer- and all-cause mortality
as shown in Table 1.14.
35The price of cancer screening is described in Appendix Table A.1.
36Proportions of compliers in male stomach cancer are 6.7% and 11.6% in 2002 and 2003, respectively.
Weighted average is calculated by the formula, X2002×6.7+X2003×11.66.7+11.6 . Corresponding figures in female stomach
cancer are 9.2% and 13.3%, and in breast cancer are 8.5% and 13.6%.
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the cutoff.37 Screening is often accompanied by procedures paid for out-of-pocket expenses by
the patients such as conscious sedation in the case of EGD and ultrasonography to perform a
biopsy of breast tissue. I assume that 30% of EGD procedures are undergone with conscious
sedation. I also assume that the cost of conscious sedation and breast ultrasonography are
$30 and $100, respectively.
Transportation costs are also considered. Transportation costs are based on the average
transportation cost for a clinic visit computed from the Korean National Health and Nu-
trition Examination Survey in 2005.38 The number of first visits is equal to the number of
screenings undertaken, and I assume that those with “cancer suspicion” result from cancer
screening made a follow-up visit.
Lastly, I consider the opportunity cost resulting from lost labor productivity. Since
the insurance contribution is a fixed percentage of wage, foregone labor productivity can
be directly calculated.39 Since the insurance contribution is based only on base salary (not
including bonuses and benefits), this leads to conservative estimates of the cost. The number
of lost work days is the number of screenings undergone by employees in each sample.
The total estimated cost costs for identifying one additional case of male stomach, female
stomach, and female breast cancers are $15,073, $59,590, and $63,811, respectively. Direct
screening costs, transportation costs, and lost labor productivity account for 58%-66%, 20%-
22%, and 13%-19% of total cost, respectively.
37I use the average biopsy rate of the entire sample. Average biopsy rate of stomach cancer screening were
26.7% and 39.8% in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Average biopsy rate of breast cancer screening were 25.5%
and 38.5% in 2002 and 2003, respectively.
38The average transportation costs for a round trip clinic visit are $19.31 and $15.61 for males and females,
respectively, in 2005. These cost are consumer price index (CPI) adjusted. Based upon a 2005 base of 100,
the CPI is 90.747 and 93.946 in 2002 and 2003, respectively.
39I assume that screening only takes one day. The monthly wage is divided by 23, the average number of
working days in a month, to compute daily labor productivity.
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1.7 Conclusion
My paper presents empirical evidence on the impacts of and behavioral responses to cost-
sharing in population-based public cancer screening. I use an RD design that takes advantage
of the unique experience of the NCSP in Korea, which provides free stomach and breast
cancer screenings to those below the insurance contribution cutoff, while charging a 50%
copayment to those above.
My results suggest that although free cancer screening substantially increases the cancer
screening take up rate and the number of cancer detections, there is no evidence that the
program had an impact on cancer- and all-cause mortality rate. My analysis provides two
main explanations for these results. First, the initial increase in cancer detections due to
the public screening program was quickly crowded out by the decrease in cancer detections
through other channels, such as private screening and diagnostic testing. Second, those
induced into screening by the cash incentive (compliers) were relatively healthy. These
compliers’ baseline cancer prevalence and cancer mortality is as high as of those who take up
screening regardless of the availability of free cancer screening (always takers), implying no
selection effect of cost-sharing. In addition, those who do not undergo screening regardless
of the availability of free cancer screening (never takers) had the poorest health and stood
to benefit the most from the screening they did not receive.
My result suggests that in order to be successful, a population-based cancer screening
program should promote a sufficiently high take up rate in order to reach the people most in
need of cancer screening. My study also provides implications on the additional provision of
cancer screening, given that cancer screening is already popular. First, provision of cancer
screening can be crowded out easily. Crowd out is more likely the more popular cancer
screening is, which means better access to outside options. Second, people who are more
likely to have cancer would be less likely to participate in cancer screening. Therefore,
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incentives for cancer screening must be well-designed in order to reach these people.
My results also imply that findings from RCTs might be quite different from that in
population-based programs due to the behavioral responses to the programs. More broadly,
even though the findings of this study may reflect responses that are specific to cancer
screening in Korea, this analysis demonstrates that the impacts of health programs, even
when they display large participation responses, crucially depend on the potential behavioral
responses of the agents involved.
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Table 1.1: National Cancer Screening Program (NCSP)
Year Male Female Age Insurance contribution cutoff (KRW)
2002
Stomach Stomach 40 and over 26,180
Breast 40 and over 26,180
Cervix 30 and over n/c
2003
Stomach Stomach 40 and over 24,630
Breast 40 and over 24,630
Cervix 30 and over n/c
Note: This table presents cancer screenings covered by National Cancer Screening Program (NCSP) and the
cutoffs for free cancer screening. Cervical cancer screening was free of charge for all. For stomach, breast and
colorectal cancer were free for those with insurance contribution below the cutoff, while 50% copayment was
charged those above. Liver cancer screening is offered since 2003 with a cutoff 16,750 KRW. Liver cancer
screening targets on people with chronic liver disease such as liver cirrhosis, and HBV and HCV related liver
diseases, explaining less than 1% of the population. Unit is KRW. $1 ≈ 1,000KRW.
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Table 1.2: Basic Statistics
Male Female
N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev
Panel A. General Information
Age 4,041,275 53.9 11.2 4,460,789 56.2 12.3
Cancer Screening Eligibility 4,041,275 0.347 0.476 4,460,789 0.374 0.484
Standard insurance contribution 4,041,275 0.468 1.006 4,460,789 0.441 1.006
Employment 4,041,275 0.625 0.484 4,460,789 0.157 0.364
Panel B. Medical expenditure (Unit:1000KRW=$1)
Total 3,641,741 709.9 1709.2 4,217,969 796.9 1524.9
Non cancer 3,641,741 643.7 1479.7 4,217,969 760.0 1395.1
Cancer 3,641,741 66.3 812.4 4,217,969 37.0 595.3
Panel C. Screening take up (Year 1-2)
Stomach cancer screening 4,041,275 0.097 0.295 4,460,789 0.110 0.312
EGD 4,041,275 0.042 0.200 4,460,789 0.043 0.202
UGI 4,041,275 0.058 0.233 4,460,789 0.068 0.251
Breast cancer screening 4,460,789 0.114 0.317
General health screening 4,041,275 0.467 0.499 4,460,789 0.287 0.452
Panel D. Cumulative screening take up (Year 1-6)
Stomach cancer screening 4,041,275 0.512 0.868 4,460,789 0.586 0.840
Breast cancer screening 4,460,789 0.626 0.865
General health screening 4,041,275 1.819 1.744 4,460,789 1.198 1.307
Panel E. Cumulative Cancer Incidence (up to Year 6)
Stomach 4,021,374 0.013 0.112 4,440,967 0.005 0.074
Breast 4,440,967 0.005 0.073
Panel F. Cumulative mortality (up to Year 6)
All-cause 4,041,275 0.073 0.261 4,460,789 0.057 0.231
Non-cancer 4,041,275 0.047 0.211 4,460,789 0.043 0.202
Cancer-related 4,041,275 0.027 0.161 4,460,789 0.014 0.117
Stomach cancer-related 4,041,275 0.005 0.071 4,460,789 0.003 0.059
Breast cancer-related 4,460,789 0.002 0.046
Note: This table shows summary statistics of study samples. N is the sample size and Std. Dev refers a standard deviation. The data
covers universe Korean people with employee health insurance. Screening take up is defined as 1 for individuals took cancer screening
within two-years from the offer. See text for definitions of variables. All measures are at the baseline
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Table 1.3: Result of Public Cancer Screening
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Male stomach cancer screening
Total Cancer Cancer incidence
Panel A1. Whole sample
Total 3,948,584 17,447 0.44%
Screening non-takers 3,687,115 15,599 0.42%
Screening takers 261,469 1,848 0.71%
Panel A2. By screening result (among screening takers)
Normal 123,462 317 0.26%†
Cancer suspicion 11,585 749 6.47%‡
Other stomach disease 126,422 782 0.62%
Panel B. Female stomach cancer screening
Panel B1. Whole sample
Total 4,411,321 8,482 0.19%
Screening non-takers 4,001,177 7,674 0.19%
Screening takers 410,144 808 0.20%
Panel B2. By screening result (among screening takers)
Normal 228,523 150 0.07%†
Cancer suspicion 11,590 320 2.76%‡
Other stomach disease 170,031 338 0.20%
Panel C. Female breast cancer screening
Panel C1. Whole sample
Total 4,411,321 7,299 0.17%
Screening non-takers 3,972,497 6,325 0.16%
Screening takers 437,922 974 0.22%
Panel C2. By screening result (among screening takers)
Normal 331,144 250 0.08%†
Cancer suspicion 39,518 347 0.88%‡
Other stomach disease 67,260 377 0.56%
Note: This table shows the results of the stomach and breast cancer screenings. Each panel consists of two sub-panels. The first
sub-panel presents the statistics of the entire sample, which contains all individuals regardless if they get screened for cancer or not.
The next sub-panel presents statistics by the cancer screening result of screening takers. Column (1) presents the total number of
people in each category, and column (2) presents the number of cancer detections within two years in each category. Cancer incidence,
the proportion of new cancer cases out of the total number of people, is presented in column (3). False negative is statistics with ’†’
and false positive is 1 - statistics with ’‡’.
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Table 1.4: Effect of Cost-Sharing on Cumulative Cancer Screening Take up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependant variable Eligibility Screening take up Eligibility Screening take up
Year 1-2 Year 1 Year 1-2 Year 3-6 Year 3-6
Panel A. Male stomach cancer screening
bandwidth 0.3 0.3 IK(0.14) 0.3 IK(0.12) 0.3 IK(0.09) 0.3 IK(0.12)
1.0000** 0.0791** 0.0695** 0.0829** 0.0725** 0.0543 -0.0252* 0.0007 -0.0119*
(0.000) (0.0078) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0174) (0.064) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005)
N 1,260,729 1,260,729 606,937 1,260,729 465,339 1,260,729 408,959 1,260,729 465,335
Panel B. Female stomach cancer screening
bandwidth 0.3 0.3 IK(0.07) 0.3 IK(0.09) 0.3 IK(0.09) 0.3 IK(0.11)
1.0000** 0.1115** 0.1711** 0.1087** 0.0919** 0.0702 -1.0550** -0.0015 -0.0185**
(0.000) (0.0085) (0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0182) (0.070) (0.010) (0.012) (0.003)
N 1,396,081 1,396,081 271,655 1,396,081 445,477 1,396,081 271,655 1,396,081 506,252
Panel C. Female breast cancer screening
bandwidth 0.3 0.3 IK(0.18) 0.3 IK(0.06) 0.3 IK(0.09) 0.3 IK(0.24)
1.0000** 0.1101** 0.1085** 0.1065** 0.1936** 0.0702 -1.0550** -0.0021 -0.0086
(0.000) (0.0106) (0.0148) (0.0124) (0.0110) (0.070) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
N 1,396,081 1,396,081 823,434 1,396,081 271,655 1,396,081 271,655 1,396,081 1,026,628
Note: Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1). The running variable is the
standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at standardized insurance
contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Table 1.5: Effect on Cumulative Stomach Cancer Detection, Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year Year 1 Year 1-2 Year 1-3 Year 1-4 Year 1-5 Year 1-6 Year 3-6
Panel A. Cumulative stomach cancer detection by public screening
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.35)
0.00013 0.00045* 0.00044* 0.00052* 0.00069** 0.00051* 0.00006 0.00003
(0.00015) (0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00020) (0.00022) (0.00010) (0.00011)
N 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,244,400 1,458,485
Panel B. Cumulative stomach cancer detection by other channels
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.39)
0.00003 -0.00046** -0.00068* -0.00080* -0.00072+ -0.00063 -0.00010 -0.00010
(0.00004) (0.00012) (0.00028) (0.00037) (0.00040) (0.00041) (0.00034) (0.00033)
N 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,212,427 1,244,400 1,733,954
Panel C. Overall cumulative stomach cancer detection
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.37)
0.00020 0.00004 -0.00017 -0.00019 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00011
(0.00017) (0.00024) (0.00039) (0.00050) (0.00058) (0.00057) (0.00037) (0.00038)
N 1,212,427 1,234,492 1,244,400 1,249,522 1,252,297 1,254,031 1,244,400 1,559,108
Note: Dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are cumulative stomach cancer detection by public screening, by other channels, and
overall cumulative detections, respectively. Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1).
The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at
standardized insurance contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
respectively.
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Table 1.6: Effect on Cumulative Stomach Cancer Detection, Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year Year 1 Year 1-2 Year 1-3 Year 1-4 Year 1-5 Year 1-6 Year 3-6
Panel A. Cumulative stomach cancer detection by public screening
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.25)
0.00013** 0.00022** 0.00015 0.00022+ 0.00027* 0.00028* 0.00007 0.00005
(0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00013) (0.00010) (0.00011)
N 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,385,151 1,018,478
Panel B. Cumulative stomach cancer detection by other channels
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.18)
0.00002 -0.00016+ -0.00024 -0.00023 -0.00005 0.00004 0.00018 0.00051**
(0.00005) (0.00009) (0.00015) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00010)
N 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,385,151 816,816
Panel C. Overall cumulative stomach cancer detection
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.27)
0.00018** 0.00008 -0.00007 0.00000 0.00022 0.00032+ 0.00025 0.00026+
(0.00006) (0.00010) (0.00019) (0.00018) (0.00015) (0.00016) (0.00015) (0.00015)
N 1,368,472 1,380,172 1,385,151 1,387,618 1,389,023 1,389,878 1,385,151 1,332,383
Note: Dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are cumulative stomach cancer detection by public screening, by other channels, and
overall cumulative detections, respectively. Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1).
The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at
standardized insurance contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
respectively.
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Table 1.7: Effect on Cumulative Breast Cancer Detection, Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year Year 1 Year 1-2 Year 1-3 Year 1-4 Year 1-5 Year 1-6 Year 3-6
Panel A. Cumulative breast cancer detection by public screening
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.18)
0.00007+ 0.00017** 0.00013+ 0.00010 -0.00004 -0.00010 -0.00026+ -0.00035**
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00013) (0.00016) (0.00013) (0.00011)
N 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,385,151 816,816
Panel B. Cumulative stomach cancer detection by other channels
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.24)
0.00013+ -0.00014 -0.00018 -0.00037* -0.00041* -0.00047* -0.00034 -0.00009
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00011) (0.00017) (0.00020) (0.00022) (0.00020) (0.00021)
N 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,368,472 1,385,151 1,018,478
Panel C. Overall cumulative breast cancer detection
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 IK(0.28)
0.00027** 0.00008 0.00001 -0.00021 -0.00039** -0.00051** -0.00060** -0.00058**
(0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00012) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00018)
N 1,368,472 1,380,172 1,385,151 1,387,618 1,389,023 1,389,878 1,385,151 1,332,384
Note: Dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are cumulative breast cancer detection by public screening, by other channels, and
overall cumulative detections, respectively. Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1).
The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at
standardized insurance contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
respectively.
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Table 1.8: Effect on Early Detection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Cancer detected within 2 year Cancer detected after 3-6 year
Gender Male Female Female Male Female Female
Cancer Stomach Stomach Breast Stomach Stomach Breast
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
40.8 169.7 -220.3 -84.0 374.4 -29.9
(182.5) (436.1) (310.6) (166.7) (342.2) (364.5)
N 5,237 2,373 2,163 10,595 4,785 4,562
Note: The dependent variable is the amount of medical expenditure at the first year of cancer detection. Each cell represents a
coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1). The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution.
Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at standardized insurance contribution in parentheses. **, * and +
indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Table 1.9: Selection Effect by Cost-Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Male stomach cancer
Dependent variable Stomach cancer screening result Cancer detection
Normal Cancer suspicion Other disease
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.29) 0.3 IK(0.56) 0.3 IK(0.33) 0.3 IK(0.24)
0.06878** 0.06883** 0.00123 0.00296 -0.07001** -0.06214** 0.00024 0.00048
(0.01132) (0.01134) (0.00315) (0.00247) (0.01103) (0.01034) (0.00030) (0.00031)
N 97,186 97,185 97,186 162,648 97,186 110,433 130,413 111,160
Panel B. Female stomach cancer
Dependent variable Stomach cancer screening result Cancer detection
Normal Cancer suspicion Other disease
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.31) 0.3 IK(0.64) 0.3 IK(0.33) 0.3 IK(0.16)
0.05642** 0.05642** -0.00598** -0.00692** -0.05044** -0.04710** 0.00012 0.00016
(0.00704) (0.00704) (0.00089) (0.00094) (0.00731) (0.00762) (0.00021) (0.00025)
N 162,907 162,907 162,907 289,627 162,907 186,289 185,371 95,666
Panel C. Female Breast cancer
Dependent variable Breast cancer screening result Cancer detection
Normal Cancer suspicion Other disease
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.13) 0.3 IK(0.28) 0.3 IK(0.16) 0.3 IK(0.15)
0.03899** 0.03467* -0.00025 -0.00023 -0.03874** -0.03519** 0.00006 0.00051
(0.00825) (0.01300) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00759) (0.00896) (0.00026) (0.00029)
N 162,979 56,439 162,979 153,127 162,979 86,649 186,922 95,985
Note: The sample is restricted to screening takers. Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of
equation (1.1). The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors
clustered at standardized insurance contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent level respectively.
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Table 1.10: Characteristics of Compliers, Always Takers and Never Takers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Male, stomach cancer screening
Total Compliers Always Never t-stat
Takers Takers (2)=(3) (2)=(4) (3)=(4)
Panel A1. Proportion 1.000 0.096 0.051 0.853
Panel A2. Public screening take-ups
stomach cancer (Year 1-2) 0.103 1.000 1.000 0.000
stomach cancer (Year 1-6) 0.542 2.042 2.090 0.363 8.8 2038.7 304.0
general health (Year 1-2) 0.568 1.106 1.134 0.457 10.0 698.4 224.8
general health (Year 1-6) 1.713 2.561 2.811 1.455 35.6 303.1 104.3
Panel A3. Mortality
Cumulative stomach cancer detection (6 year) 0.0130 0.0167 0.0146 0.0125 3.0 28.8 2.9
Cumulative stomach cancer mortality (6 year) 0.0051 0.0034 0.0024 0.0054 3.5 21.2 10.1
Cumulative all-cause mortality (6 year) 0.0727 0.0493 0.0332 0.0760 15.4 77.4 38.9
Panel B. Female, stomach cancer screening
Total Compliers Always Never T-stat
Takers Takers (2)=(3) (2)=(4) (3)=(4)
Panel B1. Proportion 1.000 0.118 0.066 0.816
Panel B2. Public screening take-ups
stomach cancer (Year 1-2) 0.133 1.000 1.000 0.000
stomach cancer (Year 1-6) 0.657 2.085 2.042 0.438 10.7 2009.9 384.8
general health (Year 1-2) 0.352 1.073 0.965 0.291 64.8 1075.1 363.5
general health (Year 1-6) 1.235 2.544 2.380 1.107 33.6 837.7 245.0
Panel B3. Mortality
Cumulative stomach cancer detection (6 year) 0.0052 0.0049 0.0046 0.0050 1.0 0.7 1.1
Cumulative stomach cancer mortality (6 year) 0.0034 0.0011 0.0006 0.0037 3.7 34.5 20.9
Cumulative all-cause mortality (6 year) 0.0525 0.0140 0.0113 0.0569 5.2 148.4 75.8
Panel C. Female, breast cancer screening
Total Compliers Always Never T-stat
Takers Takers (2)=(3) (2)=(4) (3)=(4)
Panel C1. Proportion 1.000 0.118 0.067 0.815
Panel C2. Public screening take-ups
breast cancer (Year 1-2) 0.136 1.020 1.010 0.000
breast cancer (Year 1-6) 0.690 2.119 2.109 0.468 2.6 1952.6 390.2
general health (Year 1-2) 0.352 1.076 0.967 0.289 61.7 1094.4 351.7
general health (Year 1-6) 1.235 2.546 2.397 1.103 29.9 846.0 245.4
Panel C3. Mortality
Cumulative breast cancer detection (6 year) 0.0052 0.0057 0.0064 0.0051 1.8 6.3 3.1
Cumulative breast cancer mortality (6 year) 0.0022 0.0001 0.0002 0.0026 1.4 40.0 19.2
Cumulative all-cause mortality (6 year) 0.0525 0.0140 0.0123 0.0571 3.8 148.8 81.2
Note: This table presents the mean characteristics of the entire sample for bandwidth [-0.3,0.3] (Column 1), compliers (Column 2),
always takers in bandwidth [0,0.3] (Column 3), and never takers in bandwidth [-0.3,0] (Column 4). The mean characteristics of
compliers are estimated from Equation (1.3). Columns 5 to 7 present t-statistics from two sample t-test comparing compliers and
always takers, compliers and never takers, and always takers and never takers, respectively.
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Table 1.11: Comparing Compliers with Always Takers and Never Takers
Dependent Variable : 6-Year Cumulative Cancer Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Male stomach cancer
Sample Screening takers Screening non-takers
Compliers vs. Always takers Compliers vs. Never takers
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.46) 0.3 IK(0.30)
0.00070 0.00093+ -0.00053 -0.00059
(0.00058) (0.00052) (0.00035) (0.00035)
N 130,413 198,231 1,130,316 1,156,970
Panel B. Female stomach cancer
Sample Screening takers Screening non-takers
Compliers vs. Always takers Compliers vs. Never takers
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.31) 0.3 IK(0.32)
0.00027 0.00027 0.00022 0.00034
(0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00018) (0.00021)
N 185,371 185,371 1,210,710 1,321,841
Panel C. Female breast cancer
Sample Screening takers Screening non-takers
Compliers vs. Always takers Compliers vs. Never takers
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.36) 0.3 IK(0.33)
0.00014 -0.00007 0.00029+ 0.00040*
(0.00025) (0.00020) (0.00015) (0.00015)
N 186,922 227,356 1,209,159 1,385,665
Note: The dependent variable is 6-Year cumulative cancer mortality. I restrict sample to screening takers in Columns (1) and (2), and
screening non-takers in Columns (3) and (4). Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1).
The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at
standardized insurance contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level
respectively.
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Table 1.12: Effect on Other Behavioral Responses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Male
Dependent variable Health screening Medical expenditure ($)
Year 3-6 Year 1-2 Year 3-5 Year 1-5
Bandwidth 0.3 IK (0.15) 0.3 IK(0.24) 0.3 IK(0.25) 0.3 IK(0.25)
-0.0410+ -0.0593+ -1.1 0.6 2.1 2.9 11.9 14.0
(0.021) (0.033) (12.5) (13.9) (27.8) (33.2) (34.3) (41.1)
N 1,260,729 667,548 970,661 820,817 905,003 765,586 841,751 711,935
Panel B. Female
Dependent variable Health screening Medical expenditure ($)
round 2 & 3 Year 1-2 Year 3-5 Year 1-5
Bandwidth 0.3 IK (0.18) 0.3 IK(0.50) 0.3 IK(0.28) 0.3 IK(0.50)
-0.0131 -0.0184 12.9 13.5+ -18.0 -13.8 -8.5 -11.7
(0.013) (0.015) (8.8) (7.2) (20.9) (20.7) (27.6) (26.4)
N 1,396,081 823,434 1,219,294 2,008,286 1,164,312 1,120,102 1,123,043 1,850,072
Note: Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1). The running variable is the
standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at standardized insurance
contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Table 1.13: Effect on Intermediate Health Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Male
Dependent variable Blood sugar BMI Obesity Cholesterol
R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.0858 0.4815 0.0089 0.0131 -0.0033 -0.0021 -0.2125 -0.2866
(0.229) (0.364) (0.011) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.326) (0.415)
N 385,222 340,704 384,997 340,497 384,997 398,406 384,736 339,665
Panel B. Female
Dependent variable Blood sugar BMI Obesity Cholesterol
R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3 R2 R3
Bandwidth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.7122** 0.0908 0.0297** 0.0328** 0.0088** -0.0017 -0.9765** -0.3523
(0.231) (0.198) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.338) (0.425)
N 273,933 268,214 273,675 267,961 273,675 353,559 273,417 267,015
Note: Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1). The running variable is the
standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at standardized insurance
contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Table 1.14: Effect on Cumulative Mortality (6 Year)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Male
Dependant variable Stomach cancer mortality All-cancer mortality Non-cancer mortality All-cause mortality
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.32) 0.3 IK(0.44) 0.3 IK(0.31) 0.3 IK(0.27)
-0.00062+ -0.00052 -0.00147+ -0.00086 -0.00202 -0.00167 -0.00349 -0.00336
(0.00034) (0.00035) (0.00078) (0.00073) (0.00155) (0.00156) (0.00210) (0.00216)
N 1,260,729 1,441,721 1,260,729 1,931,589 1,260,729 1,373,890 1,260,729 1,218,000
Panel B. Female
Dependant variable Stomach cancer mortality Breast cancer mortality All-cancer mortality Non-cancer mortality All-cause mortality
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.25) 0.3 IK(0.28) 0.3 IK(0.32) 0.3 IK(0.24) 0.3 IK(0.33)
-0.00011 -0.00007 0.00001 0.00003 -0.00014 0.00004 0.00079 0.00088 0.00065 0.00176
(0.00015) (0.00017) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00042) (0.00037) (0.00101) (0.00104) (0.00126) (0.00112)
N 1,396,081 1,026,628 1,396,081 1,343,027 1,396,081 1,524,119 1,396,081 1,026,628 1,396,081 1,178,589
Note: Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1). The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is
used. Robust standard errors clustered at standardized insurance contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Table 1.15: Behavioral Responses by Cancer Screening Result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Gender Male Female
Dependant variable Future screening take-ups Medical Expenditure Future screening take-ups Medical Expenditure
Health Stomach ca Year 1-2 Year 3-5 Year 1-5 Health Stomach ca Breast ca Year 1-2 Year 3-5 Year 1-5
Eligibility -0.0825** -0.0464** 4.0 -12.9 1.1 -0.0770** -0.0696** -0.0688** 20.2* -25.7 -10.4
(0.020) (0.010) (13.0) (27.8) (35.3) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (9.7) (21.9) (28.9)
Eligibility * Stomach Normal 0.0260* -0.0258 16.7 20.4 27.6 -0.0358 -0.0129+ 0.0102 6.9 -24.3 -32.0
(0.012) (0.020) (24.8) (53.2) (64.9) (0.024) (0.007) (0.009) (27.2) (60.9) (83.4)
Eligibility * Stomach Cancer 0.1344 0.0038 761.5 58.0 377.0 -0.0026 -0.0390 -0.0885 588.7 944.5 603.2
(0.093) (0.100) (812.3) (934.5) (1546.1) (0.154) (0.093) (0.168) (761.9) (1365.2) (1806.1)
Eligibility * Stomach False(+) 0.0786** 0.0591* 52.3 403.4 367.6 0.0053 0.0185 0.0350 -70.3 169.5 113.1
(0.023) (0.022) (131.1) (251.7) (377.1) (0.044) (0.037) (0.039) (70.8) (132.7) (171.5)
Eligibility * Stomach Other 0.0399** -0.0290+ -38.2 -79.8 -129.9 -0.0311 -0.0202** 0.0127 -31.6 -51.1 -87.8
(0.012) (0.017) (24.0) (65.5) (80.8) (0.026) (0.007) (0.011) (23.4) (55.6) (72.2)
Eligibility * Breast Normal -0.0694** -0.0230 -0.0801** 53.8* 138.8** 192.9**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (23.1) (39.6) (55.8)
Eligibility * Breast Cancer 0.1759 0.0994 0.0887 -1106.1 -1638.4 -1378.2
(0.169) (0.181) (0.165) (1864.6) (974.2) (1555.7)
Eligibility * Breast False(+) 0.0009 0.1047* 0.1326* 210.9 481.1 651.2
(0.070) (0.049) (0.052) (192.9) (518.8) (622.8)
Eligibility * Breast Other -0.0600** -0.0089 -0.0620** 31.3 231.5** 253.1**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (21.2) (36.8) (50.8)
Constant 0.9711** 0.3727** 342.2** 1,492.6** 1,785.8** 0.7282** 0.4343** 0.4561** 287.3** 1,414.7** 1,681.3**
(0.012) (0.009) (12.710) (26.096) (32.255) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (8.2) (17.5) (25.0)
N 1,260,729 1,260,729 970,661 905,003 841,751 1,396,081 1,396,081 1,396,081 1,219,294 1,164,312 1,123,043
Note: The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is used. Robust standard errors clustered at standardized insurance contribution in
parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. N is number of observations
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Table 1.16: Cost for cancer detection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Male, Stomach cancer N Unit cost ($) Total cost ($) Proportion
Panel A1. Direct screening cost
Administration 180.0 3.8 679 0.05
UGI 117.0 33.8 3,959 0.26
EGD 63.0 33.9 2,137 0.14
Biopsy 63.2 22.9 1,448 0.10
Conscious sedation 18.9 30.0 567 0.04
Subtotal 8,790 0.58
Panel A2. Transportation cost
1st visit 180.0 17.9 3,225 0.21
Follow-up visit 8.0 17.9 143 0.01
Subtotal 3,367 0.22
Panel A3. Opportunity cost
Loss of labor productivity 94.0 31.0 2,916 0.19
Total 15,073 1.00
Panel B. Female, Stomach cancer
Panel B1. Direct screening cost
Administration 808.9 3.8 3,049 0.05
UGI 547.9 33.8 18,541 0.31
EGD 261.1 33.9 8,855 0.15
Biopsy 295.9 22.9 6,778 0.11
Conscious sedation 78.3 30.0 2,349 0.04
Subtotal 39,573 0.66
Panel B2. Transportation cost
1st visit 808.9 14.5 11,714 0.20
Follow-up visit 18.5 14.5 268 0.00
Subtotal 11,982 0.20
Panel B3. Opportunity cost
Loss of labor productivity 259.2 31.0 8,035 0.13
Total 59,590 1.00
Panel C. Female, Breast cancer
Panel C1. Direct screening cost
Administration 646.0 3.8 2,435 0.04
Mammography 646.0 16.2 10,457 0.16
Biopsy 228.0 27.6 6,297 0.10
Ultrasonography 228.0 100.0 22,796 0.36
Subtotal 41,985 0.66
Panel C2. Transportation cost
1st visit 832.7 14.5 12,058 0.19
Follow-up visit 60.0 14.5 869 0.01
Subtotal 12,927 0.20
Panel C3. Opportunity cost
Loss of labor productivity 287.0 31.0 8,898 0.14
Total 63,811 1.00
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Figure 1.1: Eligibility for Free Public Cancer Screening
Panel A. Eligibility in males
Panel B. Eligibility in females
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A and B are eligibility for free public cancer screening in males and females, respectively. The
running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point
bins. Y-axis is based on residuals from a regression (1) with a standard set of control variables. The solid lines are fitted values from
local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately
on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence intervals. Dependant variable is an indicator for eligibility.
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Figure 1.2: Effect of Cost-Sharing on Cumulative Public Cancer Screening Take up, up to 2 years
Panel A. Stomach cancer take up, Male
Panel B. Stomach cancer take up, Female
Panel C. Breast cancer take up, Female
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are male stomach, female stomach, and female breast cancer take ups,
respectively. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable
within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel
with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure 1.3: Effect on Future Eligibility for Free Public Cancer Screening, 3 to 6 Years after
Screening Offer
Panel A. Future eligibility in males
Panel B. Future eligibility in females
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A and B are future eligibility for free public cancer screening in males and females,
respectively. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable
within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel
with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. Y-axis is based on residuals from a regression (1)
with a standard set of control variables. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence intervals. Dependant variable is an indicator for
eligibility.
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Figure 1.4: Effect on Future Cancer Screening Take up, 3 to 6 Years after Screening Offer
Panel A. Future stomach cancer take up, Male
Panel B. Future stomach cancer take up, Female
Panel C. Future breast cancer take up, Female
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are future male stomach, female stomach, and female breast cancer take ups,
respectively. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable
within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel
with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence
intervals.
52
Figure 1.5: Effect on Cumulative Cancer Detections, up to 2 years
Panel A. Cancer detection by public mass cancer screening
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Panel B. Cancer detection by other channels
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Panel C. Total cancer detection
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are 2-year cumulative cancer detections by public cancer screening, by other channels, and overall cancer detections, respectively.
The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from
local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are
95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.6: Effect on Future Cancer Detections, 3 to 6 Years after Screening Offer
Panel A. Cancer detection by public mass cancer screening
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Panel B. Cancer detection by other channels
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Panel C. Overall cancer detection
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are cumulative cancer detections between year 3 and 6 by public cancer screening, by other channels, and overall cancer
detections, respectively. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines
are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff.
The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.7: Effect on Medical Expenditure in the First Year of Cancer Detection (Early Detection)
Panel A. Cancer detected within 2 years
Panel B. Cancer detected after 3 to 6 years
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Note: The dependent variable in Panels A and B are the medical expenditure in the first year of cancer detection in year 1-2 and 3-6, respectively. The running variable is the
standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the
dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure 1.8: Selection Effect by Cost-sharing (Screening Results): Among Screening-takers
Panel A. Probability of being normal
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Panel B. Probability of being cancer suspicion
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Panel C. Probability of detecting other disease
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Note: The sample is restricted to screening takers. Dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are probability of being normal, being cancer suspicion, and detecting other disease,
respectively. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted
values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded
regions are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.9: Selection Effect by Cost-sharing (Cancer Detection): Among Screening-takers
Panel A. Stomach cancer detection, Male
Panel B. Stomach cancer detection, Female
Panel C. Breast cancer detection, Female
Note: The sample is restricted to screening takers. Dependent variables in Panels A, B, and C are male stomach, female stomach, and
female breast cancer detections, respectively. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the
mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded
regions are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.10: Compliers vs. Always takers vs. Never takers: 6-Year Cumulative Cancer Mortality
Panel A. Compliers vs. Always takers, Among screening takers
Male, Stomach cancer Female, Stomach cancer Female, Breast cancer
Panel B. Never takers vs. Compliers, Among screening non-takers
Male, Stomach cancer Female, Stomach cancer Female, Breast cancer
Note: The samples in Panel A and B are restricted to screening takers and screening non-takers, respectively. Dependent variable is 6-year cumulative cancer mortality. The running
variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear
regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It is estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.11: Effect on Future General Health Screening Take ups
Panel A. Male
Panel B. Female
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A and B are the number of general health screening take ups in year 3-5 in males and
females, respectively. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a
rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95
percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.12: Effect on Medical Expenditure
Panel A. In year 1-2, Male Panel B. In year 1-2, Female
Panel C. In year 3-5, Male Panel D. In year 3-5, Female
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A and B are medical expenditure in year 1-2 for males and females, respectively. The
dependent variables in Panels C and D are medical expenditure in year 3-5 for males and females, respectively. The running variable is
the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines
are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It
estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.13: Effect on Intermediate Health Outcomes, Male
Panel A. Obesity, Round 2 Panel B. Obesity, Round 3
Panel C. Blood Sugar, Round 2 Panel D. Blood Sugar, Round 3
Panel E. Cholesterol level, Round 2 Panel F. Cholesterol level, Round 3
Note: The dependent variables are probability of being obese (BMI≥25), blood sugar level, and cholesterol level, respectively, in
males. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within
0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a
bandwidth of 0.3 points. It estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.14: Effect on Intermediate Health Outcomes, Female
Panel A. Obesity, Round 2 Panel B. Obesity, Round 3
Panel C. Blood Sugar, Round 2 Panel D. Blood Sugar, Round 3
Panel E. Cholesterol level, Round 2 Panel F. Cholesterol level, Round 3
Note: The dependent variables are probability of being obese (BMI≥25), blood sugar level, and cholesterol level, respectively, in
females. The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within
0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a
bandwidth of 0.3 points. It estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.15: Effect on 6 year Cumulative Mortality
Panel A. Male
Stomach cancer mortality Non-cancer mortality All-cause mortality
Panel B. Female
Stomach cancer mortality Breast cancer mortality Non-cancer mortality All-cause mortality
Note: The dependent variables in Panels A and B are 6-year cumulative cancer, non-cancer and all-cause mortalities in males and females, respectively. The running variable is the
standardized insurance contribution. Open circles plot the mean of the dependent variable within 0.05 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the
dependent variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 0.3 points. It estimated separately on each side of the cutoff. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.16: Effect on Mortality (trend)
Panel A. Stomach cancer, Male
Panel B. Stomach cancer, Female
Note: This figure illustrates a changing trend mortalities over time. Each dot represents a coefficient β from different local linear
regression of equation (1.1). None of the estimates is statistically significant.
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Chapter 2
Long-Term Care insurance, Informal




As countries face rapidly aging populations and rising healthcare costs, policies affecting long-term
care—services targeting health or personal needs for people with chronic illness or disability—
become increasingly important. For example, the share of those age 65 and over in the United
States is expected to increase from 13.0% in 2010 to 20.2% in 2050. For Korea, the corresponding
shares are 16.5% and 38.2%.1 Moreover, the shares of those age 80 and over, for whom the need
for long-term care is highest, are expected to double from 3.7% to 7.4% in the United States and
increase severalfold from 1.9% to 14.5% in Korea.2 At the same time, societal changes such as
declining family size and rising female labor force participation are likely to reduce the availability
of family caregivers. In terms of costs, public and private spending on long-term care in the
U.S. totaled $183 billion in 2003, or 1.6% of GDP (GAO (2005)). Moreover, a third of Medicaid
spending in 2006 went towards long-term care (CBO (2007)).
Much of long-term care is provided informally. As needs expand and costs rise, understanding
the role of informal care in meeting this escalating demand becomes increasingly important. This
paper aims to shed light on an important aspect—the substitutability of formal for informal care.
For example, if formal long-term care services directly substitute for—rather than supplement—
informal care, the cost of provision will rise without necessarily increasing the total care received
by disabled persons. This could have welfare consequences for the caregivers in terms of their
participation in the labor force as well as on intergenerational household bargaining. Thus, under-
standing the welfare impacts will require understanding under what situations and through which
services formal care substitutes for informal care. Additionally, as governments develop and refine
long-term care policies, implications for economic efficiency will be substantial. Informed policies
will need to assess the costs and benefits of subsidizing various types of care—in particular, home
versus facility—measured both by direct costs of subsidization as well as potential costs or savings
from other medical expenses.
In this paper, we study subsidies for formal home and facility care and their corresponding
1Data are from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932400893, in Colombo et al. (2011).
2Data are from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932400874, in Colombo et al. (2011).
66
impacts on informal caregiving and medical expenditures in Korea. This study has a number of
advantages that allow us to address this topic and improve upon the existing literature. First,
we account for endogeneity in the choice of long-term care by using plausibly exogenous variation
induced by a regression discontinuity design. Specifically, long-term care benefits in Korea are
assigned based on an assessment score that is very difficult to precisely control. Second, these
benefits vary at multiple cutoffs which allow us to separate the impact of home and institutional
care benefits. Specifically, the first set of thresholds isolates the impact of just home care benefits;
the second set of thresholds allows us to compare home or institutional care benefits versus just
home care benefits; and the third set of thresholds allows us to look at the impact of an increase
in the relative price of institutional care. Third, our analysis benefits from unique administrative
data on formal home and institutional care, informal care, and medical expenditures.
Our main finding is that the benefits of home and facility care are heterogeneous across physical
function level and therefore setting policy appropriately has the potential to dramatically reduce
medical expenses. Specifically, substantial reductions in medical expenses arise from incentiviz-
ing transitions from home to facility care among people who are partially dependent for several
activities of daily living, while incentivizing transitions from facility to home care among people
who are completely dependent for several ADLs. This finding is not likely culturally or context
specific and is consistent with programs in the U.S. such as Money Follows the Person that seeks
to transition people with Medicaid from institutions to the community. We also find that formal
long-term care is not a strong substitute for informal long-term care at the extensive margin, but
find evidence that it does so at the intensive margin. Indeed, given that Korea is a “strong family
ties” country, we argue that our results constitute a lower bound for similar effects in the U.S.
Specifically, we find that among individuals who are partially dependent for some activities of
daily living3, government subsidies for formal home care lead to an increase in its utilization, with
no impact on informal caregiving at the extensive margin, as measured by child caregiving and
independent living. We do find evidence for a reduction at the intensive margin, measured by the
3Partially dependent for some ADL’s roughly corresponds to needing assistance moving around; partially de-
pendent for several ADL’s roughly corresponds to being unable to move on one’s own; completely dependent for
several ADLs roughly corresponds to being bedridden. See Table 2.1.
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use of short-term respite care, which provides temporary relief for the receipient’s caregiver. We
also find no impact on medical expenses. Among individuals who are partially dependent for several
activities of daily living, reimbursement of institutional care leads to an increase in its utilization
with corresponding reductions in informal caregiving and medical expenses. Among individuals
who are completely dependent for several activities of daily living, we find that an increase in
the relative price of institutional care leads to substitution of home care for institutional care.
We find no impact on informal caregiving, but we find substantial decreases in medical spending,
largely accounted for by a reduction in hospital expenses. From a policy perspective, these findings
suggest that among more able individuals, home care may be reduced with minimal detriment to
their health; and that among the less able, incentives to transition from facility to home care may
improve quality of life and reduce program costs overall.
We explore additional mechanisms for explaining our findings. First, we determine whether
crowd out explains our lack of findings on informal care. While we find that public long-term
care insurance leads to partial crowd out of private spending on long-term care, long-term care
utilization still increases overall. Thus, crowd out is not likely the sole reason for our limited
findings on informal care. We also assess the impact of long-term care insurance on short run-
mortality, as this measure is important in and of itself and in order to rule out differential mortality
in affecting our estimates. We find no statistically significant differences in mortality across all
thresholds. Lastly, we show that our results are robust to various checks and specifications of our
estimation strategy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief discussion
of the literature and our contribution. Section 2.3 explains Korea’s Long-Term Care Insurance
program and motivates our empirical strategy. Section 2.4 describes the data. Section 2.5 provides
a conceptual framework for considering the impacts of subsidies for long-term care. Sections 2.6
and 2.7 present the empirical framework and results, followed by additional robustness checks in
Section 2.8. Section 2.9 provides a brief discussion and Section 2.10 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
Much of the empirical work on understanding the substitutability of formal for informal care is
limited in scope and suffers from endogeneity concerns (papers that do not account for endogene-
ity include Soldo (1985), Wolinsky, Mosely, and Coe (1986), and Bass and Noelker (1987)). The
concern with endogeneity is that absent an exogenous source of variation, confounding unobserved
characteristics as well as the joint nature of the formal versus informal care decision may lead to
misleading findings. For example, to the extent that formal and informal care are positively corre-
lated with unobserved negative health shocks, a naive analysis would find them to be complements
even if they were substitutes. Also problematic is that they may be substitutes in some instances
and complements in others. For example, an individual may rely on a child caregiver for assistance
with basic activities of daily living but may seek formal assistance for more skill-intensive needs
such as physical therapy. This highlights the importance of being able to address endogeneity as
well as account for different types of formal care and informal care.
One way to address the issue of endogeneity is through the use of instrumental variables. Using
number of adult children and presence of a daughter who has no child at home as instruments,
Lo Sasso and Johnson (2002) find that frequent help from children for basic personal care reduces
the likelihood of future nursing home use. Using number of children and whether the eldest child
is a daughter as instruments, Van Houtven and Norton (2004) find that informal care reduces
home health care and nursing home use. Using children’s gender, marital status, and distance
as instruments, Charles and Sevak (2005) find that receipt of informal home care reduces the
probability of future nursing home use. However, it is unclear whether the necessary exclusion
restrictions would be satisfied, given the complexity of fertility decisions and bargaining over
intergenerational transfers. Thus, it is useful to assess the robustness of these results through
studies based on more plausibly exogenous sources of variation.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 induced such a source of variation. This act led to regional
variation in overall decreases in Medicare reimbursement for home care services. Using this source
of variation, McKnight (2006) finds resulting reductions in home care utilization that were not
offset by increases in institutional care or other medical care. She also finds no adverse health
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consequences as a result of the policy. Using the same source of variation, Orsini (2010) and
Engelhardt and Greenhalgh-Stanley (2010) find reductions in independent living, and Golberstein
et al. (2009) find increases in the probability of the use of informal caregiving. A significant limita-
tion these papers share, however, is that due to data limitations and their source of identification,
they focus primarily on the provision of home care.
The Channeling demonstration in the U.S. provides another opportunity to assess the relation-
ship between informal and formal care, through randomized evaluation. This experiment sought
to substitute a system of home and community care for institutional care. Christianson (1988)
and Pezzin, Kemper, and Reschovsky (1996) assess the impact of public home care provision and
find limited reductions in the care provided by informal caregivers. However, the latter paper
does find a significant increase in the probability that unmarried persons live independently. This
highlights the importance of considering both informal caregiving directly and independent living.
The results of the Channeling demonstration are limited, however, in that the sample population
was particularly frail and the scope was inherently limited to the provision of home care, not
institutional care.
Regarding impacts on other medical expenditures, McKnight (2006) finds that reductions in
home health care reimbursement and utilization did not lead to increases in other medical care and
were not associated with adverse health consequences. Evaluating the impact of Channeling on
other medical expenses, Wooldridge and Schore (1988) find large reductions in nursing home use
among those who were already in a nursing home at baseline but no impact on the use of hospital,
physician, and non-physician medical services.
Our view of the literature is that evidence on the substitutability of institutional and informal
care is very limited and is based mostly on observational studies. Moreover, even though under-
standing the impact of institutional care on health and other medical expenses is necessary for
cost-benefit analyses, very little is known at this point.4 In addition, while there is more work on
the substitutability of home and informal care, this evidence is limited in accounting for institu-
tional care and in being generalizable to a broader population of the elderly. This study attempts
4In a review paper, Ward et al. (2008) conclude “there is insufficient evidence to compare the effects of care home
environments versus hospital environments or own home environments on older persons rehabilitation outcomes.”
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to fill these gaps directly. By using longitudinal administrative data with measures of home care,
institutional care, informal care, and medical expenditures, and a unique policy affecting a broader
population of the elderly, we are able to account for the complex interrelationship among informal,
home, and institutional care, as well as evaluate the corresponding impacts on health and medical
expenses.
Lastly, much of the literature is based on findings in the United States and other Western
countries. Other studies outside the U.S. include Stabile et al. (2006) for Canada and Bolin et al.
(2008) for Europe. This paper contributes to this literature by providing evidence from an Asian
country.
2.3 Background
Korea implemented universal health coverage in 1989. Individuals are covered either by National
Health Insurance (NHI) or Medical Care Assistance (MCA), though both programs are overseen
by the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC). The primary distinction between NHI
and MCA is that the latter serves poor individuals. While health insurance coverage includes
outpatient care, inpatient care, and prescription pharmaceuticals, no coverage for long-term care
is included. In response to this, and due to the demographic and cultural changes affecting the
need and provision of long-term care, National Long-Term Care Insurance was implemented in
July 2008. This provides coverage for individuals age 65 and over and those with age-related needs
such as dementia and Parkinson’s disease.
2.3.1 Benefits
Long-term care insurance covers two categories of service benefits: home care and institutional
care.5 Home care includes services provided at the beneficiary’s residence. This includes home
help where a caregiver provides support for physical activities or housework, home bathing where
a caregiver assists the beneficiary in bathing, and home nursing where a nurse provides assistance
5In exceptional cases (e.g. for individuals who live in remote regions with no access to long-term care services),
cash benefits are provided. However, this represents less than 0.2% of cases.
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with such things as medication and dental hygiene. Also included within home care benefits is
short-term respite care which covers a short-term stay in a facility to allow the caregiver relief
from caregiving activities. Lastly, equipment for the support of daily tasks and physical activities
(e.g. a wheelchair) is also included in home care benefits. Institutional care benefits cover long-
term residence in a facility where meals, care, and other necessities required for daily function are
provided. See Table B.3 for more details. As in the case for general health care, the delivery of
long-term care is primarily administered through private providers.
2.3.2 Eligibility
To receive long-term care benefits, individuals must apply, submit a doctor’s referral, and be eval-
uated by an assessment team from the NHIC. Benefits are determined based on an adjusted score,
which is the sum of two components, a preliminary score and committee points. The preliminary
score is a complex, highly nonlinear function of the responses to 52 evaluation questions, encom-
passing physical and cognitive function, behavior, nursing assistance, and rehabilitation.6 Then a
local assessment committee, following guidelines determined at the national level, is able to add
or subtract up to five points to this score, based on the assessment questions and the doctor’s
referral.7
The adjusted score is used to determine benefits, as depicted in Table 2.1. Individuals who score
below 55 are not eligible for long-term care benefits. Individuals who score 55 or above (Grade
3) are eligible for reimbursement of formal home care services up to 740 USD per month, which
corresponds to approximately two hours of home help care per day.8 Individuals who score 75 or
above (Grade 2) become eligible for reimbursement of institutional care or a home care benefit
maximum of 880 USD per month.9 Individuals who score 95 or above (Grade 1) continue to be
6An example of a physical function question is whether the individual is fully independent, partially dependent,
or fully dependent for bathing. For more details, including calculation of the preliminary score, see Appendix B.
7Committee members are trained annually and when the guidelines are changed.
8See Table 2.1 for general descriptions of individuals falling into each category. All amounts in this paper are
converted to USD at the rate of 1100 KRW : 1 USD.
9If one were to use both types of care in the same month, the home care benefit would be prorated based on the
number of facility days used. However, home and facility care are inherently incompatible with each other (in our
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eligible for reimbursement of institutional care or a home care benefit maximum of 1040 USD per
month. The price of institutional care is 40 USD per day and 45 USD per day for individuals in
Grades 2 and 1, respectively. To the extent that there is a copayment, this implies that the cost
of institutional care for an individual scoring 95 is discretely higher than the cost for an individual
scoring 94.9. As a result, the increased cost of facility care along with the more generous home
care benefit incentivizes individuals to transition from institutional to home care at the margin.
Applicants are notified of their classification, not their score. They are reevaluated when major
changes to their physical or mental status occur, for the renewal of benefits, or if they appeal for
a reevaluation.10 Benefits must be renewed every twelve months, with the exception of those with
significantly high scores (> 100) who may have up to eighteen months.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the committee component of the score in relation to the preliminary score.
Note first that most activity occurs within 5 points of the actual thresholds (55, 75, 95).11 Focusing
on preliminary scores in the range [50,55) we see that some individuals are given enough points so
that their adjusted scores exceed 55, leading to eligibility for Grade 3 home only benefits. It appears
that points are rarely added or subtracted unless doing so changes the eligibility status. Focusing
on scores just above 55, the number of instances where points are deducted is negligible. Focusing
on scores below 50, we see that the number of instances where points are added is negligible,
reflecting the fact that any additional points less than 5 would not be enough to become eligible.
We find similar patterns in committee action around the remaining thresholds, except we see more
instances of subtracted points.
Figure 2.2a illustrates from another perspective how the committee component of the score
influences eligibility around the 55 threshold. It also highlights the source of identification in our
research design. The probability that the adjusted (post-committee) score exceeds the 55 point
threshold is plotted against the preliminary (pre-committee) score.12 When the preliminary score
data, only 3% of individuals utilize both types of benefits in the same year). Thus, the use of both types of services
in the same month is likely due to changes in health status as opposed to joint use.
10They are able to appeal indefinitely, though this process typically takes longer than one month.
11In practice, scores outside of five points from a threshold are less likely to be reviewed by the committee.
12See Section 2.6 for a discussion of the specification used to generate the figures.
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is below 50, the probability that the adjusted score exceeds the 55 point threshold is effectively
zero, consistent with the guideline that the maximum number of points that can be added is five.
When the preliminary score is above 55, the probability that the adjusted score exceeds the 55
point threshold is effectively one, reflecting the rarity with which the committees subtract points
around this threshold. Between 50 and 55, enough points are added to the preliminary scores of a
fraction of individuals so that their adjusted scores exceed 55. Note that this illustration suggests
an implicit threshold at 50 (and similarly at 70 and 90). That is, scores above the explicit threshold
of 55 virtually guarantee eligibility; scores below the implicit threshold of 50 virtually exclude the
possibility of eligibility.
Correspondingly, this figure illustrates the source of identification for our analysis—namely,
comparing similar individuals who have different probabilities of treatment.13 For instance, those
with preliminary scores just below 50 have a probability of eligibility for home care benefits of zero.
Those with preliminary scores just above 50 have a probability of about 8 percent. This allows
us to use variation in the probability of eligibility in order to look at the impact of eligibility on
reimbursed formal long-term care utilization and relevant outcomes, including independent living,
informal caregiving, and medical expenditures. Moreover, the different grades of benefits afford us
the possibility of studying several aspects of long-term care utilization. The 50 and 55 thresholds
isolate the impact of home care benefits, while the 70 and 75 thresholds isolate the impact of home
and institutional care benefits versus just home care benefits. The 90 and 95 thresholds allow us
to look at the impact of an increase in the price of institutional care along with an increase in the
maximum benefit for home care.
2.3.3 Financing
Long-term care insurance is financed by the government (20%), copayments (up to 20%), and
insurance contributions. Insurance contributions were 0.21%, 0.24%, and 0.35% of wages in 2008,
2009, and 2010, respectively. Employers paid 50% of this amount. The copayment for home care
services is 15% while that of institutional care is 20%, but the poor (MCA individuals) are exempt
13We discuss our empirical strategy more formally in Section 2.6.
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from copayments, and individuals with certain conditions faced reduced copayments.14
2.4 Data
This study uses a merged dataset combining NHIC administrative data for National Long-Term
Care Insurance (NLTCI) and National Health Insurance (NHI). The sample consists of 171,373
individuals who were assessed in 2008 and 2009. The NLTCI data spans 2009 and the first half of
2010 and contains information on gender, age, living and caregiving arrangements, preliminary and
adjusted scores from the first eligibility assessment, and reimbursed long-term care utilization.15
The NHI data spans 2007 through 2009 and contains annual total, hospital, outpatient, and
pharmacy expenditures. Our main explanatory variable is the 2009 preliminary score. Our main
measures of formal care are reimbursed home care expenditures and number of institutional care
days. We measure home care in expenditures as an aggregate measure to capture the variety of
home care services that are used. Our main measures of informal care are an indicator of whether
a child is the primary caregiver and an indicator of whether the individual lives alone or with a
spouse. The latter measure is our measure of independent living, consistent with the previous
literature. Our main measures of medical expenditures are total medical and hospital expenses.16
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics by grade. All measures are at baseline, except for long-
term care facility days and home care expenditures. ADL Index is a composite score based on
activities of daily living questions from the assessment, with a higher number indicating less func-
tion. Individuals with lower grades are sicker as measured by the ADL Index, medical expendi-
tures, and hospital days, and tend to have more resources as measured by insurance contribution
and MCA percentage. Finally, sicker individuals are less likely to have a child caregiver and live
independently.
14Individuals who face reduced copayments include the disabled, people with rare and incurable diseases, and the
marginally poor.
15Because we only observe NLTCI data for the first half of 2010, our sample is reduced by approximately half
when looking at informal care outcomes. Analysis of predetermined variables shows covariates are balanced in the
reduced sample.
16These amounts are inherently exclusive of long-term care expenses.
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2.5 Conceptual Framework
2.5.1 Household Responses to Public Long-Term Care Reimbursement
We adapt the model developed by Stabile, Laporte, and Coyte (2006) in order to determine what
implications arise from public reimbursement for long-term care.
Consider a two person household consisting of an elderly care recipient and an informal caregiver
(e.g. a child). Let household utility be
U(X,L,A)
where X represents market goods and services, L the leisure time of the caregiver, and A the care
recipient’s functional ability. The care recipient’s ability is defined by the technology
A = A(C,H, F )
where C is time spent delivering informal care, H is formal home care, and F is institutional
(facility) care. Time and financial constraints are satisfied if
PXX + PH(1− sH)H + PF (1− sF )F +WC = V +W (T − L)
where PX is the cost of market goods and services, PH is the cost of formal home care, PF is the
cost of facility care, s is the relevant government subsidy (in other words, 1-copay), V is non-wage
income, W is the cost of the caregiver’s time, and T is the total time for leisure, caregiving, and
labor market work. The household selects performance ability A so that the marginal benefit of
greater ability is equal to the marginal cost of its production. The household cost-effectively selects
H, F , and C in order to achieve ability A. L is selected so that the marginal benefit of leisure
equals the marginal cost of foregone market goods and services.
We now illustrate the relevant intuition and predictions derived from the model (see Stabile,
Laporte, and Coyte (2006) for a more extensive treatment). When an individual is ineligible for
reimbursed benefits, she may pay out-of-pocket for H at price PH . Grade 3 benefits provide a
subsidy for H, reducing its effective price to PH(1− sH) up to the maximum level of benefits mH .
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This is depicted in Figure 2.4, where the isocost line rotates out as the price of H falls from PH to
PH(1 − sH), up to the point where H = mH . After this point, the price returns to PH . Through
an income effect, these benefits will increase the optimal level of A and lead to corresponding
increases in C and H if these are normal inputs to its production. Because H is cheaper relative
to C, the substitution effect will lead to increases in H but decreases in C. Thus, while Grade 3
benefits are predicted to lead to increases in A and H, the net impact on C is unclear.
Grade 2 benefits lead to both an increase in the maximum level of home benefits, mH , as well as
provide a subsidy for facility benefits, sF . Note that home and facility care are effectively perfect
substitutes in the production of A as they are inherently incompatible with each other.17 This is
reflected in Figure 2.5, where the isocost line rotates out as the effective price of F falls, and the
individual chooses to utilize only F . To the extent that F and C are substitutes, this should lead
to an increase in F and decreases in C and H. If the individual decides not to utilize F , then the
impact of mH on H would depend on the amount used with only Grade 3 benefits, as in shown
in Figure 2.6. If the individual were using less than the maximum beforehand, there would be no
impact on A, C, or H. If the individual were using the maximum, this would lead to a pure price
effect, resulting in an increase in A and H, but a decrease in C. Therefore, we expect A and F to
increase, but C to decrease. The impact on H is uncertain.
Grade 1 benefits lead to both an increase in the maximum level of home benefits, mH , as well
as an effective increase in the price of facility benefits, PH , as discussed in Section 2.3.2. Thus, the
impact of these benefits is a combination of the figures for previous benefits. We expect the increase
in the relative price of F to entice some people to switch from F to H (reverse of Figure 2.5).
Combined with an increase in mH (Figure 2.6) we expect a decrease in F and increase in H. The
impact on A is ambiguous, however, as the impact of the relative increase in PF may not be offset
by the increase in mH . The impact on C is also ambiguous and depends again on whether H and
C are substitutes or complements.
In summary, the model yields the following predictions for government reimbursement of long-
term care:
17In our data, only 3% of individuals utilize both home and facility benefits in the same year, and this is likely
due to changes in health status as opposed to joint use.
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1. Grade 3 benefits lead to an effective price decrease in home care. As a result, we expect
increases in ability and home care. The impact on informal caregiving will depend on whether
home care and informal caregiving are substitutes or complements.
2. Grade 2 benefits lead to an effective price decrease in facility care and an increase in the
maximum level of home care benefits. Thus, we expect increases in ability and facility care,
and a decrease in informal caregiving. The impact on home care is ambiguous.
3. Grade 1 benefits lead to an effective price increase in facility care and an increase in the
maximum level of home care benefits. Thus, we expect an increase in home care and a
decrease in facility care. The impacts on ability and informal care is ambiguous.
2.6 Empirical Framework
We conduct a regression discontinuity analysis at the thresholds 50, 55, 70, 75, 90, and 95 of
the preliminary score that exploit the discontinuous probabilities of eligibility resulting from the
committee adjustment portion of the score. Specifically, the aim is to compare outcomes across
individuals with similar characteristics but differing probabilities of eligibility for benefits.
The corresponding regression model we estimate is:
outcome = β1I{S ≥ τ}+ f(S) + γX + , (2.1)
where S is the preliminary score, f(S) is a function of the score, τ is the relevant cutoff, and X
is a set of control variables—age, gender, insurance dummies, region type dummies, and health
insurance contribution (a proxy for income)—which serve to improve precision of the estimates.
In implementing the regression discontinuity design, an important consideration is the model-
ing of f(S). One approach is to model it parametrically through linear, quadratic, or higher order
polynomials that are allowed to differ on each side of the cutoff. The other approach, which we
follow here, is to estimate the discontinuity nonparametrically, which we implement by local linear
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regression with a rectangular kernel.18 Our preferred estimates are based on a bandwidth of 2.5
points, in order to reduce bias by staying close to the cutoff while still maintaining enough preci-
sion. To assess the sensitivity of our results, we also present results from the optimal bandwidth
determined by the procedure in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), hereafter abbreviated IK. We
also evaluate the sensitivity of our results to other bandwidths and higher order polynomials in
Section 2.8.3.
A critical assumption to our identification strategy is that individuals just below a threshold
are indeed comparable to individuals just above a threshold. One potential threat to this assump-
tion is whether individuals are able to precisely sort around the threshold (Lee (2008)). If this
assumption holds, then one implication is that the density of scores should be continuous around
the threshold. Figure 2.3 displays the density of scores, in 0.1-point bins, in our sample around
each threshold. With the exception of 75, we see no indication that the density is discontinuous
around the threshold. Figure B.2a displays a smoother density of scores, in 1-point bins, which
suggests a discontinuity in the density at 55. To address concerns of possible sorting, Figure B.2b
displays the density of scores for those who were assessed in April of 2008, the first opportunity
for eligibility evaluations and two months before the actual launch of the program. To the extent
that the patterns in the 2009 density are due to sorting, we would not expect to see them in
the April 2008 density, when individuals have no experience with how responses are mapped into
scores. A comparison of Figures B.2a and B.2b indicates that the distribution of scores around
the thresholds is strikingly similar for both periods.
Figure B.3 provides evidence for the complexity of the score function and the amount of vari-
ation inherent in the score. We take the set of individuals who responded “fully independent”
for changing position and changed their response to “needs partial support.” We recalculate their
score and then plot this against their original score. Highlighting how highly interactive the score
function is, note how the change in the response may lead to a change in the score ranging from a
few points to more than ten points. This example indicates three things. First, it is difficult to pre-
18As noted in Lee and Lemieux (2010), the choice of kernel typically has little impact and while a triangular
kernel is boundary optimal, a more transparent way of putting more weight on observations close to the cutoff is
to reestimate a rectangular kernel based model using a smaller bandwidth.
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cisely control the score. Second, there is a large degree of randomness within a few points. Third,
it is possible that a response that indicates a sicker individual may actually lead to a reduction in
points. This results from the highly interactive nature of the way the score is calculated.19
To the extent that there is no sorting and that the observed distribution of scores is due to
the score function, individuals on each side of the threshold may still be comparable. As discussed
in Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009), stacking alone may not violate the regression discontinuity
assumptions since violation arises from the interaction of the stacking and the endogenous sorting
of individuals. Thus, the more fundamental question for our identification strategy is whether the
distribution of predetermined characteristics is identical on each side of the threshold. We show
in Section 2.8.1 that with the exception of the 75 threshold, predetermined characteristics appear
balanced around each threshold.
2.7 Results
We begin with our main results on the impact of eligibility on reimbursed utilization of formal
long-term care, informal caregiving, and medical expenditures in Section 2.7.1. In Section 2.7.2, we
address crowd out of private spending on formal-long term care and other potential explanations for
our findings. In Section 2.7.3, we assess the cost-effectiveness of the LTCI program by comparing
reimbursed long-term care expenses to medical expenditures.
2.7.1 Findings on Reimbursed Formal LTC, Informal Caregiving, and
Medical Expenditures
Grade 3 (Home Care Only) Benefits
Figure 2.2a displays the probability of eligibility for Grade 3 benefits (i.e. home care only) as a
function of the preliminary score, and Table 2.3a the estimated increases in probability at 50 and
55. Scoring just above 50 leads to an 8 percentage point increase in the probability of eligibility for
home care benefits while scoring just above 55 leads to a 17 percentage point increase. To address
19We conducted this exercise for all questions and responses. This example is representative of our findings.
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the impact of eligibility on utilization, Figure 2.7a displays reimbursed home care expenditures as a
function of the preliminary score. Note that the pattern of expenditures corresponds well with the
pattern of eligibility. In particular, as the score increases from 50 to 55, home care expenditures
increase with the probability of eligibility for home care benefits. Moreover, there are discrete
increases in expenditures at 50 and 55 corresponding to the discrete increases in the probability
of eligibility for home care benefits at those points. Panel A of Table 2.4 contains estimates of
the increases in reimbursed home care expenditures at 50 and 55. The increase in eligibility at 50
leads to a $300 increase in reimbursed home care expenditures while the increase in eligibility at
55 leads to a $850 increase. Regarding institutional care, Figure 2.7b displays reimbursed facility
care days as a function of the preliminary score and Panel B of Table 2.4 contains estimates of
the corresponding increases at 50 and 55. Consistent with no change in facility care benefits, the
increases in eligibility for Grade 3 benefits at 50 and 55 do not lead to a statistically significant
increase in facility care use.
We now assess the corresponding impacts of these changes in reimbursed formal care utiliza-
tion on informal care. Figure 2.8 displays the one year changes in the probabilities of living
independently (living alone or with one’s spouse) and having a child caregiver as functions of the
preliminary score. Figure 2.8a shows that the probability of living independently over time falls
across all scores as individuals get sicker on average. Moreover, the decrease is larger for those
who were not eligible for Grade 3 benefits relative to those who were. In particular, the pattern
corresponds to the pattern of reimbursed home care utilization. Despite the overall patterns, how-
ever, the increased utilization of reimbursed home care at the thresholds does not translate to a
statistically significant change in the probability of living independently as estimated in Panel D of
Table 2.4. We find similar results for child caregiving. As seen in Figure 2.8b, the change in child
caregiving is positive across all scores as individuals age and become sicker over time. However,
it increases trivially among those eligible for Grade 3 benefits, suggesting that formal home care
is able to avert the use of informal care. Moreover, the use of child caregiving increases among
those who were not eligible for Grade 3 benefits. Again, however, despite the overall patterns, the
increased utilization at the thresholds is not associated with a statistically significant change in
81
child caregiving as estimated in Panel C of Table 2.4.
There are several possible explanations for the limited impact on informal care. One potential
explanation is that individuals who are ineligible for home care benefits may be able to finance
these services privately, so that the probability of living independently (having a child caregiver)
would fall (increase) less than in the absence of such an option. Another potential explanation is
that formal home care allows a partial reduction, as opposed to complete elimination, of informal
care. In other words, while there is no estimated impact on the extensive margin, there may still
be an impact on the intensive margin. We address these potential explanations in Section 2.7.2.
Lastly, we assess the impact of increased home care utilization on medical expenditures and
hospital utilization. Figure 2.9 displays the one year changes in these measures as functions of the
preliminary score. We find no evidence that home care use impacts these outcomes, both across
scores and treatment regimes as well as at the thresholds. The latter estimates are confirmed
in Panels E and F of Table 2.4. The finding of no impact on medical expenditures is perhaps
unsurprising given that the primary purpose of long-term care is not so much to restore or maintain
health as it is to increase the general quality of life for the individual. We discuss these findings
further in Section 2.7.3.
In summary, we find that eligibility for reimbursed home care benefits leads to the utiliza-
tion of reimbursed formal home care. However, the use of reimbursed formal home care has no
statistically significant impact on the use of informal care at the extensive margin nor on other
medical utilization. There are various possible explanations for explaining the lack of an impact
on informal care, which we address in Section 2.7.2.
Grade 2 (Home or Institutional Care) Benefits
We now assess the impact of Grade 2 benefits (i.e. where individuals can choose between home
and institutional care benefits) on our outcomes of interest. Figure 2.2b displays the probability of
eligibility for Grade 2 benefits as a function of the preliminary score, and Table 2.3b the estimated
increases in probability at 70 and 75. Scoring just above 70 leads to a 4 percentage point increase
in the probability of eligibility for home and institutional care benefits while scoring just above
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75 leads to a 37 percentage point increase. To address the impact of eligibility on utilization,
Figure 2.10 displays reimbursed home care expenditures and facility care days as a function of the
preliminary score. We see that the pattern of reimbursed institutional care days corresponds well
with the pattern of eligibility for those benefits. Consequently, reimbursed home care expenditures
decrease as individuals substitute facility care for home care. Moreover, there are discrete increases
(decreases) in facility (home) care use corresponding to the discrete increases in the probability of
eligibility for institutional care at 70 and 75. Panels A and B of Table 2.4 contains estimates of
the increases in reimbursed formal care expenditures at 70 and 75. The increase in eligibility at 70
leads to a 24 day increase in reimbursed facility use and a $400 decrease in home care expenditures.
The increase in eligibility at 75 leads to a 23 day increase in reimbursed facility use and a $550
decrease in home care expenditures.
We next assess corresponding changes in informal care. Figure 2.11 displays the one year
change in the probabilities of living independently and having a child caregiver as functions of
the preliminary score. Again, we see that the change in the probability of living independently is
negative across all scores as individuals get sicker over time, with the reduction slightly stronger
for individuals eligible for facility benefits. However, there is no statistically significant change
in independent living corresponding to the change in long term care utilization at 70 and 75 as
estimated in Panels D of Table 2.4. For child caregiving, we see that it falls with the onset
of facility care benefits, mimicking the pattern of eligibility for Grade 2 benefits. There is also
suggestive evidence that the increased utilization of facility care benefits over home care benefits at
70 translates to a reduction in child caregiving, consistent with estimates in Panel C of Table 2.4.
Estimates at our preferred bandwidth suggest that Grade 2 benefits lead to a statistically significant
decrease in the probability of child caregiving of 3 percentage points. Estimates at more stringent
bandwidths, including the IK, suggest similarly negative impacts, but these estimates are not
precise enough to be statistically significant. Similarly for 75, estimates suggest negative, but not
statistically significant, impacts on child caregiving.
There are several possible explanations for these findings. That there is no impact on inde-
pendent living may not be a surprise. While facility care substitutes for home care, they both are
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linked to dependent living situations. Although we do not find impacts of home care on the use of
child caregiving, we do find suggestive impacts of facility care on the use of child caregiving. This
is consistent with the fact that formal home care may reduce but not completely eliminate child
caregiving. It is less likely that significant child caregiving would continue while the care recipient
resides in a facility. We address these considerations more carefully in Section 2.7.2.
Lastly, we look at the impact of increased facility care and decreased home care utilization
on medical expenditures and hospital utilization. Figure 2.12 displays the one year changes in
these measures as functions of the preliminary score. We find no evidence that the substitution of
facility care for home care at 70 impacts these outcomes. However, there is suggestive evidence at
75 that the substitution of facility care for home care leads to reductions in medical expenses and
that this is largely accounted for by a reduction in hospital expenses. The estimates are shown
in Panels E and F of Table 2.4. One explanation for this finding is that these individuals in this
setting are less likely to experience costly accidents. Another explanation is that patients are able
to transition sooner out of more expensive hospital care and into less expensive facility care. We
discuss these findings further in Section 2.7.3.
In summary, we find that eligibility for facility care benefits leads to the substitution of facility
care for home care. There is no impact on independent living, but there is suggestive evidence that
this leads to a reduction in child caregiving at the extensive margin. There is also evidence for a
corresponding reduction in medical utilization. As in our analysis of Grade 3 benefits, it will be
important to take into account the ability of individuals to pay for formal long-term care services
out of pocket, which we address in Section 2.7.2.
Grade 1 (Increased Maximum for Home Care, Increased Price for Institutional Care)
Benefits
We now assess the impact of Grade 1 benefits on our outcomes of interest. Recall that these benefits
are effectively an increase in the maximum benefit for home care combined with a discontinuous
increase in the cost of facility care at the threshold. Figure 2.2c displays the probability of eligibility
for Grade 1 benefits as a function of the preliminary score, and Table 2.3c the estimated increases
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in probability at 90 and 95. Scoring just above 90 does not lead to a statistically significant
increase in eligibility for Grade 1 benefits. Thus, assessments at this threshold serve as placebo
tests for this design. As expected, we find no statistically significant impacts on reimbursed home
expenditures and facility days, child caregiving and living independently, and medical and hospital
expenses (see Figures 2.13 to 2.15 and the fifth row of Table 2.4).
A preliminary score just above 95 leads to an 83 percentage point increase in the probability
of eligibility for Grade 1 benefits. To address the impact of eligibility on utilization, Figure 2.13
displays reimbursed home care expenditures and facility care days as functions of the preliminary
score, and Panels A and B of Table 2.4 corresponding estimates of the discontinuities. Due to
how Grade 1 benefits lead to a relative price increase in facility care, Grade 1 benefits at 95
lead to a 30 day decrease in the number of facility days used and a $930 increase in reimbursed
home expenditures. As shown in Figure 2.14, with corresponding estimates in Panels C and D of
Table 2.4, this shift in formal long-term care mix is not statistically significantly associated with
changes in informal care, as measured by child caregiving and independent living. However, as
shown in Figure 2.15 and Panels E and F of Table 2.4 we do find a statistically significant decrease
in medical expenses of almost $700, coupled with a decrease in hospital expenditures of nearly
the same amount. The fact that we find an impact of home care on medical expenditures in this
case but not for Grade 3 may be due to the fact that individuals who receive Grade 1 benefits are
more frail and susceptible to health shocks that can be ameliorated by formal care. We discuss
our findings on medical expenditures further in Section 2.7.3.
In summary, we find that a relative increase in the price of facility care leads to increased
utilization of formal home care. This shift in formal long-term care services has no impact on
informal care but has a substantial impact on medical expenses, largely due to decreased hospital
expenditures.
2.7.2 Crowd Out and Informal Care Intensity
The analysis of Grade 3 benefits in Section 2.7.1 indicated that an increase in reimbursed home
care expenditures had little impact on informal care as measured by independent living and child
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caregiving. One possible explanation for this finding is that public financing simply crowds out
private expenditures for home care. Another possible explanation is that publicly financed home
care enables individuals to reduce informal caregiving at the intensive margin. Unfortunately, our
data does not provide measures of private spending on home care, nor does it contain measures of
the amount of caregiving. Instead we focus on a subpopulation of individuals—those in the MCA
program and thus are poor—for whom the likelihood of out-of-pocket spending is expected to be
low.
The first column of Table 2.5 indicates estimates of the increase in home care utilization at
50 and 55 for the subset of MCA individuals. As in the overall sample, Grade 3 benefits lead
to an increase in home care expenditures at 50 and 55 for MCA individuals. Columns two and
three indicate estimates of the change in informal care at 50 and 55. As in the overall population,
there is no statistically significant impact of Grade 3 benefits on informal care at the extensive
margin for MCA individuals. Given that MCA individuals are unlikely to pay for home care out
of pocket, these results suggest that the lack of an observable impact on informal care is not likely
to be solely due to crowd out of private spending on formal care by public reimbursement.
A remaining explanation for why public reimbursement has no impact on informal care at the
extensive margin is that the impact is on the intensive margin. To shed light on this possibility,
we look at the impact of Grade 3 benefits on the use of a particular home care service, short-term
respite care. Short-term respite care is short-term (i.e. a few days) facility care used to provide
temporary relief for the regular caregiver. Thus, use of this type of home care is a strong indication
for reduction in informal caregiving at the intensive margin. Indeed, as shown in Table 2.6, which
shows estimates for several home care services, we find Grade 3 benefits lead to a statistically
significant increase in the use of short-term respite care at 55.
As in the case for home care, we only observe publicly financed facility care. To measure the
extent of crowd out we need a measure of all facility care, regardless of whether it is financed pub-
licly or privately. To accomplish this we use an indirect measure of all facility utilization: medical
spending occurring in a long-term care facility (i.e. regardless of financing). If the probability
of having medical spending occurring in a long-term care facility is a fixed percentage of those
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who attend a long-term care facility (at the threshold) then changes in the probability of having
medical spending occurring in a long-term care facility will capture changes in the probability of
attending a long-term care facility. In other words, if
# w/Medical Spending in LTC Facility
# in LTC Facility
is
fixed, then a percentage increase in the denominator will be tied to a percentage increase in the
numerator of the same magnitude.20 Table 2.7 presents estimates of the impact at 70 and 75 of the
probability of using a publicly financed long-term care facility and the probability of having medi-
cal spending occurring in a long-term care facility. Scoring just above 70 is associated with a 25%
increase (6.5 percentage points on a base of 25.7%) in the probability of using publicly financed
facility care. However, using the probability of medical spending occurring in a long-term care
facility as a proxy for all facility care shows that the probability of using facility care, regardless
of financing, increases only 18.4% (2.9 percentage points on a base of 15.7%) at 70. This suggests
that about a quarter of publicly financed care is used to substitute for out of pocket expenditures.
The corresponding measure of crowd out at 75 is 46.7%. The fact that crowd out is higher at 75
than 70 is not surprising, given that individuals at 75 have more need for long-term care and thus
are more likely to privately finance facility care in the absence of LTCI. While these measures of
crowd out are substantial, they also suggest that crowd out is not complete, and therefore cannot
fully explain our lack of findings for informal care.
2.7.3 LTC Expenditures and Reductions in Medical Expenses
In light of the previous results showing decreases in medical expenditure, a useful metric for
assessing the cost-effectiveness of this policy and its costs to the government is to compare the
reimbursed long-term care expenses to the changes in medical expenses. Recall that with the
administrative data we use, we are able to measure the both the universe of medical expenditures
and the universe of reimbursed long-term care expenditures. The first set of columns of Table 2.9
display the estimated impacts of all thresholds on reimbursed long-term care expenditures. For
20It is possible that those who spend out of pocket (i.e. those below the threshold) are likely to be sicker and
thus have a higher probability of medical spending occurring in a facility. To the extent that this is the case, we
will find a smaller change in the probability of having medical spending occurring in a facility and an over (upper
bound) estimate of crowdout.
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convenience, the second set of columns redisplay the impacts on medical expenditures. The third
set of columns indicate the medical expenditures saved per additional dollar of long-term care
expenditure reimbursed.
A preliminary score above 50 and 55 leads to a $208 and $931 increase in total reimbursed
long-term care expenditures, respectively. As seen earlier, however, this results in little, if any,
savings in medical expenditures. Focusing on Grade 2, we see that additional benefits for facility
care lead to an additional $500 in expenditures as individuals substitute more expensive facility
care in place of home care. However, corresponding to this increase in expenditure we find a
decrease in medical expenditures of more than $300, for a medical expenditure savings of $0.6 per
dollar of long-term care reimbursed. The fact that there is no apparent savings at 70 may be due
to heterogeneous impacts of the policy or possible bias at 75. Focusing on Grade 1 at 95 (recall
that there is little effective change in eligibility at 90), we see that additional benefits for Grade
1 lead to only small changes in expenditures as individuals tend to use more home care and less
facility care. However, this substitution leads to large impacts on medical expenditures—nearly a
$700 reduction. Thus, Grade 1 benefits lead to a medical expenditures savings of more than $650
per dollar of long-term care reimbursed. Clearly, the amount of long-term care reimbursed is not a
complete measure of the costs of the program as it does not include the administrative expenses, for
example. Moreover, medical expenses are not a complete measure of the potential cost savings of
the program as impacts on labor outcomes could have impacts on government revenue.21 However,
the large impact we measure here highlights the importance of considering the potential program
savings from reduced medical expenditures.




2.8.1 Balance of Covariates
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, an important assumption for our identification strategy is that
individuals on each side of the thresholds are comparable. A test of this assumption is to check the
balance of observable characteristics across the thresholds. Table 2.10 contains estimates of the
discontinuities around the thresholds for predetermined variables that are likely to be correlated
with our dependent variables of interest. With the exception of the 75 threshold, most of the
variables appear to be continuous around the thresholds at our preferred bandwidth.
Because we are testing numerous variables and thresholds, some discontinuities will be statisti-
cally significant by random chance. As a result, we conduct two tests which account for this, with
results presented in the last columns of Table 2.10. First, we look at a summary measure—the pre-
dicted medical expenditures from a regression of medical expenditures on the other predetermined
variables. Again, with the exception of the 75 threshold, there appear to be no discontinuities in
predicted medical expenditures at our preferred bandwidth. Second, we test whether the disconti-
nuities are jointly significant by seemingly unrelated regression, as described in Lee and Lemieux
(2010). Consistent with the first exercise, the only threshold for which the discontinuities are
jointly significant at the preferred bandwidth is 75. This leads us to believe that our results are
not impacted by unobserved confounders at the other thresholds. Nonetheless, we controlled for
the few instances of significance occurring in our variables of interest by estimating differences in
our dependent variables in our regressions.
2.8.2 Differential Mortality
Another relevant outcome is whether these benefits had any impact on mortality. This measure
is important in and of itself, and is useful because it is objective and well-defined. Moreover, it is
important to address the concern that differential mortality around the thresholds could account
for our findings. For example, if individuals just below the threshold were more likely to die as
a result of not receiving treatment, relatively healthy individuals would remain in the sample,
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minimizing any estimated impacts. We assess this by looking at mortality by 2010 around the
thresholds. Table 2.8 displays estimates of Equation 2.1 with mortality by 2010 as the outcome.
We find no statistically significant differences in mortality at all thresholds. Thus, the increase in
long-term care utilization at the thresholds has no impact on mortality in the short-run.
2.8.3 Other Specifications
A consequential decision in estimating Equation 2.1 is the choice of bandwidth. Although we
have shown that our results are qualitatively consistent at both our preferred bandwidth and the
IK bandwidth, it is useful to know how sensitive our findings are to bandwidth choice. To do
so, we reestimate Equation 2.1 for our main outcomes of interest at several bandwidths—from 1
to 5, in increments of 0.5. Figures ?? to ?? plot the estimated coefficients with 95% confidence
bands against the bandwidth. There are two things worth highlighting. First, coefficients are less
precisely estimated and more variable at very small bandwidths. Second, the coefficient estimate at
our preferred bandwidth falls within the 95% confidence bands of the estimates at other bandwidths
in general, indicating that our findings are not too sensitive to bandwidth selection.
On the specification of f(S), our approach in this paper follows Hahn, Todd, and van der
Klaauw (2001) by using local linear regressions to estimate the discontinuity at the threshold.
As shown in the previous section, our findings are consistent even at very small bandwidths.
Moreover, visual inspection suggests the relationship between eligibility (as well as our outcomes
of interest) and the preliminary score is fairly linear even at relatively large distances from the
thresholds. Nonetheless, in Figures ?? to ?? we explore how sensitive our findings are to higher
order specifications of f(S) at our preferred bandwidth. For the most part, the coefficient estimate
based on a linear specification of f(S) falls within the 95% confidence bands of estimates for higher
order specifications. However, the variance of the higher order specifications grows quite large,
which lends support for the use of linear splines.
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2.8.4 Differences-in-Differences Estimation
Our research design takes advantage of a setting with a continuous measure of long-term care
needs (i.e. the preliminary score) and thresholds that lead to “as good as random” variation in
the probabilities of benefits. One limitation of this design, however, is the reduced precision from
relying primarily on observations around the threshold. In this section, we estimate a differences-
in-differences model that relies on stronger assumptions, but has potentially improved precision.
Specifically, we compare three groups of individuals: individuals who are treated based solely on
the preliminary score (for Grade 3, we consider individuals with preliminary scores in [55,60)),
individuals who are treated based on committee guidelines (for Grade 3, these are individuals
with preliminary scores in [50,55)), and individuals who are not treated (for Grade 3, these are
individuals with preliminary scores in [45,50)). For τ ∈ {55, 75, 95}, we define commitτ ≡ 1I{τ −
5 ≤ S < τ} and treatτ ≡ 1I{τ ≤ S < τ + 5}, where S is the 2009 preliminary score. With the
untreated individuals (i.e. {S : τ − 10 ≤ S < τ − 5}) as our reference group, we estimate the





(βCt commitτ · φt + βTt treatτ · φt) + γi + φt + ηb · t+ ibt, (2.2)
where γi is an individual-specific effect, φt a year-fixed effect, ηb · t is a bin-specific linear time
trend, and the baseline year is set to t = 0.22 The key assumption underlying this estimation
method is that there are no unobserved factors that affect the three groups differentially within a
year.
Table 2.11 presents estimates of βC1 and β
T
1 from Equation 2.2. Grade 3 expenditures lead to
a statistically significant decrease in child caregiving, but have no statistically significant impact
on independent living. There is no statistically significant impact on medical expenditures or
hospital expenses. Additional long-term care expenditures resulting from Grade 2 benefits are
also associated with a statistically significant decrease in child caregiving, but not independent
living. The use of Grade 2 benefits leads to a decrease in other medical expenses, accounted for
22For our outcome measures (medical expenditures and informal care), t ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. For our long-term care
utilization measures, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Table 2.11 presents estimates of βC1 and βT1 from Equation 2.2.
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largely by hospital expenses. These results translate into a medical dollars saved per additional
dollar of reimbursed long-term care expenditure of 0.2–0.3. Grade 1 benefits are associated with a
statistically significant increase in child caregiving, but not independent living. This is consistent
with the increased use of home care among these individuals that was found earlier. The use of
Grade 1 benefits leads to a decrease in other medical expenses, largely accounted for by hospital
expenses. In this case, the medical dollars saved per additional dollar of reimbursed long-term care
expenditure is more than one, suggesting strong program savings.
The findings from this analysis are fairly consistent with our findings from the regression
discontinuity analysis. Even though the differences-in-differences analysis suggests statistically
significant impacts on child caregiving while RD estimates do not, this could be due to lack of
statistical precision. Moreover, estimates of medical expenditures saved per dollar of reimbursed
long-term care are similar across both estimation strategies.
Lastly, this estimation strategy allows us to compare the committee affected group to the auto-
matically treated group. This is particularly relevant given that assigning treatment based solely
on the preliminary score may not be optimal and that leaving room for discretionary assignment
of treatment may improve efficiency. In this analysis, there do not appear to be any striking dif-
ferences in performance between the two groups among Grades 3 and 2 individuals. However, it
appears that the committee affected group has a more substantial impact among Grade 1 affected
individuals. While this suggests the possibility that a more discretionary decision-making proce-
dure for determining treatment may be more effective than a hard rules-based criteria, we caution
that this measure (vs. quality of life, for example) may not be the primary objective to optimize
from the standpoint of the committee.
2.9 Discussion
In this paper, we find that publicly financed LTCI leads to small, if any, impacts on informal care
at the extensive margin. We determine that this is not solely due to crowdout, but partly explained
by the fact that informal care is reduced at the intensive margin. That we find limited impacts
on informal care stands in contrast to some of the previous literature, but is not surprising given
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that South Korea is a strong family ties country. That is, due to family obligations, Koreans may
find it more difficult to give up completely the responsibility of taking care of their elderly parents.
That we still find reductions in the intensive margin indicate that our results constitute a lower
bound for the effect in the U.S. in general, and may be directly indicative of population subgroups
in the U.S. such as Asians and Hispanics.
Interestingly, we find that among people who are partially dependent for several activities of
daily living, transitioning from home to facility care results in decreased medical expenditures. This
may come as a surprise at first, given that the purpose of long-term care is not so much to restore or
maintain health as it is to increase the general welfare of the individual by facilitating activities of
daily living. Indeed, we find no impacts on health as captured by mortality. However, a plausible
explanation is that the increased attention one receives in a facility may prevent costly accidents
like falling and breaking one’s hip. Another possibility is that patients are able to transition
sooner out of more expensive hospital care and into less expensive facility care. Surprisingly,
among individuals who are completely dependent for several activities of daily living, the opposite
transition leads to substantially lower medical expenses. This may be mediated by the fact that
the presence of medical professionals in a facility may lead to additional or more costly care than
if one were being cared for at the home, and that, among this population of individuals, this effect
predominates the previously mentioned effects. In fact, that transitioning people from institutions
to the community may be beneficial is consistent with the objectives of programs such as Money
Follows the Person in the U.S. This supports the more general point that our findings on medical
expenses are not culturally or context specific, and that understanding the relationship between
long-term care expenses and medical expenses may be a fruitful avenue to contain health care
costs.
2.10 Conclusion
Results from this paper provide insight into the welfare impacts of government reimbursement of
long-term care on care recipients, caregivers, and taxpayers, as well as suggestions for the design
of optimal long-term care policy. Our main finding is that the benefits of home and facility care
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are heterogeneous across physical function level and therefore setting policy accordingly has the
potential to dramatically reduce medical expenses. We also find that formal long-term care is not
a strong substitute for informal long-term care at the extensive margin.
Among individuals who are partially dependent for some activities of daily living we find that
government subsidies for formal home care lead to an overall increase in its utilization, even ac-
counting for crowd out, with no impact on informal caregiving at the extensive margin, medical
expenses, or mortality. While we find evidence for a reduction in informal caregiving at the inten-
sive margin, this suggests that if the policy objective is to increase the labor supply of individuals
caring for this population, subsidies for home care may have limited impact. Moreover, the con-
verse of our findings on medical expenses and mortality suggest that home care reimbursement
may be reduced without significant detriment to the health of the care recipient.
Among individuals who are partially dependent for several activities of daily living, additional
reimbursement of institutional care leads to the crowd out of privately financed institutional care of
up to 47%. Institutional care does increase overall, leading to reductions in informal caregiving and
medical expenses. From a policy perspective, the latter finding suggests that while substitution of
institutional care for less expensive home care may lead to increased costs, this may be partially
offset by reductions in medical expenses. Moreover, our finding on informal caregiving suggests
that this policy may lead to increased labor supply of individuals caring for this population. In
this case, optimal policy depends on the objective function of the policymaker in balancing the
tradeoff between increased taxpayer costs, reduced informal caregiving, and improved quality of
life for the care recipient.
Among individuals who are completely dependent for several activities of daily living, we find
that an increase in the price of institutional care combined with an increase in the benefit maximum
for home care leads to substitution of home care for institutional care. While we find no impact on
informal caregiving, we find substantial decreases in medical spending. From a policy perspective,
this suggests that increased incentives for the use of home care may lead to an improvement in the
welfare of care recipients while limiting or even reducing costs to taxpayers.
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Table 2.1: Overview of Grades of Benefits
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Grade
Notes: Sample consists of individuals who were assessed for long-term care insurance in 2008 and 2009.
Grade categorization is based on the 2009 adjusted score. All measures are at baseline, except for long-
term care facility days and home care expenditures. See text for definitions of variables.
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Notes: The first two columns of each panel report estimates of β from local linear regression of Equa-
tion (2.1). Each cell represents a different regression. The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score.
Controls include age, gender, region type, insurance type, and insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel.
The third column of each panel reports the optimal bandwidth determined by the IK procedure. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Table 2.4: Main Results on LTC Utilization, Informal Care, and Medical Expenditures
Notes: The first two columns of each panel in this table report estimates of β from local linear regression of Equation (2.1). Each cell represents
a different regression. The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. Controls include age, gender, region type, insurance type, and
insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel. The third column of each panel reports the optimal bandwidth determined by the IK procedure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Table 2.5: Utilization and Informal Care for MCA Individuals
Notes: The first two columns of each panel in this table report estimates of β from local linear regression of
Equation (2.1). Each cell represents a different regression. The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score.
Controls include age, gender, region type, insurance type, and insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel. The
third column of each panel reports the optimal bandwidth determined by the IK procedure. Sample consists of
individuals in the MCA program. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
Table 2.6: Detailed Home Care Utilization
Notes: Each cell reports estimates of β from a different local linear regression of Equation (2.1). Dependent
variables are measured in # of visits. The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. Rectangular kernel.
Optimal bandwidths for the IK procedure are omitted for space considerations and are available from the authors
upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Table 2.7: Crowd Out of Facility Care
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report coefficient estimates from Equation (2.1). Dependent variables are indicators for
public reimbursement of facility care and medical spending in a LTC facility. The running variable is the 2009
preliminary score. Rectangular kernel. “Change at ‘X’ ” is the estimate of β. “Base at ‘X’ ” is the predicted value
of the dependent variable at ‘X’ minus the “Change at ‘X’ ”. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Table 2.8: Effect of Eligibility on Mortality
Notes: The first two columns of this table report estimates of β from local linear regression of Equation (2.1).
Each cell represents a different regression. The dependent variable is mortality by 2010. The running variable is
the 2009 preliminary score. Controls include age, gender, region type, insurance type, and insurance contribution.
Rectangular kernel. The third column of each panel reports the optimal bandwidth determined by the IK procedure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
101
Table 2.9: LTC Expenses vs. Medical Care Savings
Notes: The first two columns of the first two panels in this table report estimates of β from local linear regression
of Equation (2.1). Each cell represents a different regression. The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score.
Controls include age, gender, region type, insurance type, and insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel. The third
columns report the optimal bandwidth determined by the IK procedure. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **
p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1. The third panel equals the coefficient in the second panel divided by the coefficient
in the first panel.
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Table 2.10: Covariate Balance
Notes: Columns 1-6 and 8 report estimates of β from local linear regression of Equation (2.1). Each cell represents a different regression. Dependent variables
are 2008 measures. The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. Rectangular kernel. Optimal bandwidths for the IK procedure are omitted for space
considerations and are available from the authors upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1. Column 7
reports the p-value from a joint test of the coefficients in each row from a SUR where the bandwidth is 2.5.
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Table 2.11: Differences-in-Differences Estimates
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Figure 2.1: Adjusted Scores vs. Preliminary Scores, 2009
Notes: This figure plots the 2009 adjusted score against the 2009 preliminary score, for individuals whose
preliminary scores fall between 45 and 105. Circle sizes correspond to the number of individuals with the
associated adjusted/preliminary score combination.
2009 adjusted score = 2009 preliminary score + committee points, where committee points ∈ [−5, 5].
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Figure 2.2: Probability of Eligibility vs. 2009 Preliminary Score
(a) Grade 3 Eligibility
(b) Grade 2 Eligibility
(c) Grade 1 Eligibility
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.3: Histograms of Scores
(a) Around Grade 3 Thresholds
(b) Around Grade 2 Thresholds
(c) Around Grade 1 Thresholds
Notes: 2009 preliminary score in 0.1 point bins.
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Figure 2.4: Impact of ↑ sH on A, C, and H
Figure 2.5: Impact of ↑ sF on A, H, and F
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Figure 2.6: Impact of ↑ mH on A, C, and H
(a) H1 < mH (b) H1 = mH
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Figure 2.7: Reimbursed Formal Care Utilization vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 3
(a) Home Care Expenditures
(b) Institutional Days
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.8: Change in Informal Care vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 3
(a) ∆ Pr(Live Independently)
(b) ∆ Pr(Child Caregiver)
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.9: Change in Medical Utilization vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 3
(a) ∆ Medical Expenses
(b) ∆ Hospital Expenses
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.10: Reimbursed Formal Care Utilization vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 2
(a) Home Care Expenditures
(b) Institutional Days
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.11: Change in Informal Care vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 2
(a) ∆ Pr(Live Independently)
(b) ∆ Pr(Child Caregiver)
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.12: Change in Medical Utilization vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 2
(a) ∆ Medical Expenses
(b) ∆ Hospital Expenses
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.13: Reimbursed Formal Care Utilization vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 1
(a) Home Care Expenditures
(b) Institutional Days
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.14: Change in Informal Care vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 1
(a) ∆ Pr(Live Independently)
(b) ∆ Pr(Child Caregiver)
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent
variable using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 2.5 points. The shaded regions are 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.15: Change in Medical Utilization vs. Preliminary Score Around Grade 1
(a) ∆ Medical Expenses
(b) ∆ Hospital Expenses
Notes: The running variable is the 2009 preliminary score. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable within 0.2 point bins. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent









According to the Centers for Disease Control, diabetes is the largest and fastest growing chronic
disease in the U.S. Diabetes is characterized by high blood sugar because the body is unable to
make or use insulin, resulting in complications such as heart disease, kidney disease, amputations,
and blindness. It is frequently not diagnosed until complications appear and as a result almost one-
third of all people with diabetes may be undiagnosed (CDC (2011)). Moreover, there is evidence
for the benefits of early treatment of diabetes or prediabetes diagnosed through usual clinical care.
These facts suggest the possible benefits from screenings of asymptomatic individuals. This is the
first study based on a quasi-experimental design to analyze the impact of screening for diabetes in
the general population. While we do not assess the effectiveness of screening versus not screening,
we do assess the impact of information obtained from screening.
The motivation behind screening in general is that early detection and intervention can increase
the likelihood of reducing complications from disease or eliminating the disease altogether. How-
ever, the effectiveness of screening depends on many factors, including the reliability of the relevant
diagnostic test, the effectiveness of treatments in terms of both efficacy and quality of life, and
costs. An example of a disease for which the potential risks are thought to outweigh the benefits of
screening is prostate cancer. This is due to false positives, benign cancers, and serious side effects
(USPSTF (2008)). In the case of diabetes, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force currently makes
no recommendation for diabetes screening for individuals without high blood pressure, due to the
lack of sufficient evidence.
In the case of diabetes, for which exercise and diet play a substantial role in the management of
the disease and prevention of complications, an important component determining the benefit of
screening is the degree to which results from the screening lead individuals to undergo changes in
behavior. In light of this, whether and how individuals process the information from screenings is
an important question. Much literature has been devoted to understanding the role of education in
the production of health (Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006), Grossman (2006), Lange (2011), Lleras-
Muney (2005)). This paper is complementary to this literature by accounting for factors such as
education that are correlated with both the attainment of information and their responses to that
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information. In addition to assessing patients’ responses and outcomes due to that information we
also study whether such responses vary according to a proxy for education.
We address these questions by exploiting a unique program where individuals undergo screening
for various health measures, including blood sugar for diabetes, and then receive notification of
their health status classification—either “normal”, “risk group”, or “suspected disease”. These
classifications vary discontinuously at different blood sugar thresholds which enable us to assess
individuals’ responses to those classifications while controlling for unobservable factors correlated
with both the attainment of information and responses to that information. We assess longer
term outcomes which are expected to be affected by screening such as future blood sugar level
and mortality. We also assess behavioral responses including follow-up clinic visit after screening,
future screening take-ups, outpatient days, and total medical expenditures. Lastly, we assess
whether responsiveness varies by education, in order to shed light on the role of education in
processing information.
We find that individuals who are classified as “risk group” have no different behavioral response
and health outcome within five years of screening than those who are classified as “normal”. How-
ever, we find that “disease suspected” classification leads to increase of clinic visit for the secondary
examinations and future screening take-ups, and decrease of outpatient days and medical expendi-
ture, however no impact on future blood sugar level and mortality. When assessing differences in
this outcome by insurance contribution (a proxy for education), we see that those in the highest
quintile respond less than those in the other quintiles, which may be explained by the fact that
more educated (higher insurance contribution) individuals respond less to the classification because
they have already largely incorporated this information from the blood sugar measure itself.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institutional
context and the screening program which creates the setting for this analysis. Section 3.3 describes




Korea provides universal health care. Individuals are covered either by National Health Insurance
(NHI) or Medical Care Assistance (MCA), though both programs are overseen by the National
Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC). The primary distinction between NHI and MCA is that
the latter serves poor individuals.
NHI operates the National Health Screening Program (NHSP), which since 1995 has provided
general screening services to people ages 40 and over free of charge every two years. People born in
odd-numbered years are encouraged to undergo screening in odd-numbered years and vice versa.
NHSP consists of the recording of medical history; measuring of height, weight, blood pressure,
vision, and hearing; chest X-ray; urine sample; blood test, including hemoglobin, cholesterol, and
rGTP; oral examination; and counseling.1 Individuals are notified of the screening results by
mail. In the report, patients are informed of their blood sugar level. They are also informed of
“normal” and “at risk” levels of blood sugar, which are “under 111” and “111-120”, respectively.2
Other measures are reported similarly. In addition to the results of each individual measure,
individuals are also informed of whether their overall results classify them as “normal”, “risk
group”, or “disease suspected”. If one’s blood sugar falls between 111 and 120, this increases the
unconditional probability of receiving a “risk group” notification relative to a blood sugar level
less than 111. If blood sugar exceeds 120, this increases the unconditional probability of being
classified as “disease suspected” (and inherently reduces the probability of being classified “risk
group”). The actual notification depends on the individual’s other measures.3 Individuals classified
as “disease suspected” are eligible for and encouraged to undergo a secondary examination.
1Screening is distinct from diagnostic testing, which is performed in response to symptoms or signs of disease.
The purpose of screening is to identify disease in asymptomatic individuals.
2Blood sugar is measured in units of mg/dL. Levels of blood sugar exceeding 120 is associated with diabetes.
3Incorporating the other measures, such as blood pressure, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, future
work will incorporate this information to isolate the impact of the diabetes specific risk vs. overall health risk.




This study uses a merged dataset combining administrative data from NHI and NHSP. The sample
consists of males born in even-numbered years who were eligible for and participated in general
screening in 2002. The data spans 2001-2006 and contains information on gender, age, insurance
contribution, screening results for individual measures including blood sugar (measured in mg/dL),
the overall health classification, whether an individual undertook a secondary examination, annual
medical expenditures, annual outpatient days, and mortality.
Our main explanatory variable is the blood sugar level in 2002 (baseline). Our key outcomes of
interest are cumulative mortality, medical expenditures and outpatient days through 2006. We are
also interested in whether individuals undertook a secondary examination and whether individuals
underwent diabetes screening in the next eligible periods. Table 3.1 displays summary statistics
of the variables of interest by overall health classification.
3.4 Empirical Framework
The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of receiving different overall health classifications
on the health and behavior of patients.4 To do so, we conduct a regression discontinuity analysis
at the 111 and 121 blood sugar levels where the probability of being notified of a particular health
status is discontinuous. Specifically, the aim is to compare outcomes across individuals who are
effectively identical but for receiving different health status notifications.5
The corresponding regression model we estimate is:
outcome = β1I{S ≥ τ}+ f(S) + , (3.1)
where S is the blood sugar level, f(S) is a function of the blood sugar level, and τ is the relevant
cutoff (111 or 121).
4In the case of medically related actions, this is likely to be the joint behavior of doctors and their patients.
5Because of the nature of the empirical design and data limitations, we are not assessing the impact of screening
vs. not screening. Rather, we are assessing the impact of the information obtained from screening.
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In implementing the regression discontinuity design, an important consideration is the modeling
of f(S). One approach is to model it parametrically through linear, quadratic, or higher order
polynomials that are allowed to differ on each side of the cutoff. The other approach, which
we follow here, is to estimate the discontinuity nonparametrically, which we implement by local
linear regression with a rectangular kernel.6 Our preferred estimates are based on a bandwidth
of 5 mg/dL, in order to reduce bias by staying close to the cutoff while still maintaining enough
precision.7
A critical assumption to our identification strategy is that individuals just below a threshold are
indeed comparable to individuals just above a threshold. One potential threat to this assumption
is if individuals are able to precisely sort around the threshold (Lee (2008)). It is not likely that
individuals are able to precisely manipulate their blood sugar level. However, other features such
as measurement may be just as problematic if it led to nonrandom sorting of scores according to
some unobservable characteristic if this characteristic were also correlated with our outcomes of
interest. An example of this would be if hospitals that served certain types of patients recorded
blood glucose levels above 120 mg/dL as 120 mg/dL.
If our original assumption holds, then an implication is that the density of scores should be
continuous around the threshold (indeed, everywhere). Figure 3.1 displays the density of blood
sugar level for the majority of our sample.8 Note that there are striking discontinuities in the
density at 110 and 120, just at the relevant thresholds. One possible explanation is that there was
rounding down (e.g. a score of 114 being recorded as 110), but this would not fully explain the
pattern observed (i.e. the reductions in density after 110 and 120).
As discussed in Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009), stacking alone may not violate the regres-
sion discontinuity assumptions since violation arises from the interaction of the stacking and the
endogenous sorting of individuals. Thus, the more fundamental question for our identification
6As noted in Lee and Lemieux (2010), the choice of kernel typically has little impact and while a triangular
kernel is boundary optimal, a more transparent way of putting more weight on observations close to the cutoff is
to reestimate a rectangular kernel based model using a smaller bandwidth.
7Our results are not sensitive to this choice.
8Measures outside of [50,150] were removed for visual reasons.
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strategy is whether the distribution of predetermined characteristics is identical on each side of the
threshold. Figure 3.3 displays the baseline measures of our outcomes of interest (for which there is
data) as a function of blood sugar level. For the most part, predetermined characteristics appear
to be balanced around each threshold.
To partially address the stacking in the density, we conduct “donut” regression discontinuity
analyses by omitting observations with blood sugar levels of 110 and 120. For transparency, in
our figures we show the mean estimates of our outcomes at all blood sugar levels, including 110
and 120. In addition to this, I further explore the possibility of systematic reporting error by
taking advantage of the fact that size of the extra density jump at the thresholds varies by county.
Figure 3.2 displays the density of blood sugar level by the counties where the size of extra density
jump is in bottom, middle and top tertiles as well as bottom 10%.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Classification
Figure 3.4 displays the probability of being classified as “normal” as a function of blood sugar
measured at baseline. There is a discrete drop in the probability of “normal” status at 111.
The fuzziness arises from the other measures which can also affect status. There is minimal
corresponding impact at 121. Figure 3.5 displays the probability of being classified as “risk group”
as a function of baseline blood sugar. There is a discrete increase in the probability of being “risk
group” at 111. At 121, there is a discrete decrease in the probability of being “risk group”. This
is due to the fact that these individuals are informed that they likely have the disease. This is
shown explicitly in Figure 3.6 which displays the probability of “disease suspected” as a function
of baseline blood sugar.
Table 3.2 presents the corresponding estimates and illustrates the change in information at each
threshold. At the 111 threshold, there is a 11 percentage point drop in the probability of “normal”
status and a complementary 11 percentage point increase in the probability of “risk group” status.
At the 121 threshold, there is a 24 percentage point drop in the probability of “risk group” status
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and complementary increase of the same magnitude in the probability of “disease suspected”
status. Thus, the 111 threshold captures the marginal impact of “risk group” vs “normal” while
the 121 threshold captures the marginal impact of “disease suspected” vs. “risk group”. Changes
in disease status classification are robust across size of extra jump at the cutoffs.
3.5.2 Behavioral Responses
This section illustrates that the changes in disease status classification led to behavior responses
including retest, future screening take-ups, annual medical expenses and outpatient days. Individu-
als who were informed that they were “disease suspected” were encouraged to undergo a secondary
examination, but not those with “risk group”. Figure 3.7 depicts the probability of retest as a
function of baseline blood sugar level. As expected, Table 3.3 indicates that more than half who
were informed “disease suspected” followed up for a retest. “Disease suspected” classification also
led increase of public health screening take up in the next eligible period (after two years) while
no impact for those with “risk group”. Consistent with these pattern, we also find that there are
no statistically significant impacts of information status on future behavioral responses by “risk
group” classification, however “disease suspected” decreases medical expenses and outpatient days.
3.5.3 Future Blood Sugar Level and Mortality
The motivation behind screening, particularly for diabetes, is in order for individuals with chronic
conditions to manage their disease and limit the occurrence of future preventable negative health
shocks and complications. We seek to assess the impact of screening information on blood sugar
level in the future and five year cumulative mortality in this section. Figure 3.8 and Table 3.4
show that there is no apparent impact on these outcomes.
3.5.4 Outcomes by Insurance Contribution
In this section, we would like to explore whether responses to information differ by education.
This is interesting for many reasons, but particularly because education may be an important
factor in processing information. Because the data does not include information on education, we
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use insurance contribution (which is directly proportional to income) as a proxy. The outcome
we consider is revisits, mainly because this is the only behavioral response that was statistically
significant in the previous section. We focus on the 121 threshold, which is the relevant threshold
for this outcome. Table 3.5 summarizes our findings. While there is no particular pattern in the
changes in information at 121, there is a fairly clear indication that the top quintile has a lower
response to the information than the other quintiles, with only 42% responding with a revisit
relative to the 60% of other quintiles. There are several possible explanations. One is that the
more responsive among the richer are more educated individuals who are more likely to have already
been diagnosed. This explanation is not likely given that there are no substantial differences in
information/diagnosis between the top and other quintiles. Another potential explanation is that
educated individuals respond less to the (redundant) diagnostic label because they have already
largely incorporated this information from the blood sugar measure itself.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of information from screening on health outcomes and behavior. We
find that “disease suspected” classification leads to increase clinic visit for the secondary exami-
nations and future screening take-ups, and decrease of outpatient days and medical expenditure,
however few impacts on health outcomes such as future blood sugar level and mortality. We also
find that the responsiveness to the classifications among the highest income quintiles is lower than
among the other quintiles, consistent with more educated individuals incorporating information
directly from the blood sugar measure itself.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Blood Sugar Level
Notes: Sample consists of male individuals born in even-numbered years and who participated in general
screening in 2002. Categories are based on baseline blood sugar levels. Individuals with blood sugar
levels of 110 and 120 were omitted from the analysis as discussed in the text. See text for definitions of
variables.
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Table 3.2: Impact of Baseline Blood Sugar Level on Notified Status
Screening Outcome
Normal At risk Disease
Panel A. 110 Cutoff
Whole sample -0.106** 0.110** -0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Bottom Tertiles -0.088** 0.094** -0.006
(0.014) (0.009) (0.022)
Middle Tertiles -0.104** 0.136** -0.024
(0.010) (0.019) (0.025)
Top Tertiles -0.122** 0.099** 0.013
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Bottom 10% -0.117** 0.060** 0.024
(0.015) (0.008) (0.030)
Panel B. 120 Cutoff
Whole sample -0.008* -0.241** 0.239**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
Bottom Tertiles -0.015+ -0.252** 0.258**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.008)
Middle Tertiles -0.014* -0.207** 0.219**
(0.004) (0.014) (0.018)
Top Tertiles 0.008* -0.249** 0.233**
(0.003) (0.011) (0.019)
Bottom 10% -0.009 -0.274** 0.268**
(0.007) (0.039) (0.038)
Notes: Each cell presents estimates of β from local linear regression of Equation (3.1). The running
variable is baseline blood sugar level. Rectangular kernel. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **
p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Table 3.3: Impact of Notified Status on Medical Behavior
Screening take-up Outpatient Days Medical Expenditure
Retest Retest Rate After 2 years After 4 Years Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Panel A. 110 Cutoff
Whole sample 0.002 -12.414 0.015** 0.004* 0.048 0.132 0.154 0.152 0.045 5.692 -0.525 -21.072 -21.464
(0.005) (24.864) (0.004) (0.002) (0.291) (0.299) (0.363) (0.276) (0.281) (4.798) (10.920) (19.960) (24.885)
Bottom Tertiles 0.002 -37.046+ 0.010 0.006+ 0.442+ 0.383 0.744* 0.698+ 0.520 17.384 24.177* 12.864 20.341
(0.008) (16.136) (0.006) (0.003) (0.199) (0.426) (0.295) (0.331) (0.409) (11.596) (9.351) (38.815) (37.376)
Middle Tertiles -0.025** -106.983+ 0.031** 0.000 -0.655 -0.719 -0.743 -1.215+ -1.197* 1.951 3.791 -58.956 16.580
(0.005) (51.162) (0.007) (0.001) (0.485) (0.712) (0.564) (0.603) (0.422) (7.692) (35.577) (40.204) (54.383)
Top Tertiles 0.026+ 104.794 0.003 0.007** 0.419 0.796+ 0.563 1.087** 0.960 -1.510 -26.316 -14.697 -96.353**
(0.012) (59.308) (0.010) (0.001) (0.475) (0.347) (0.401) (0.235) (0.633) (8.170) (23.795) (12.820) (25.132)
Bottom 10% 0.059** -81.550+ 0.034 0.010** 1.050 0.545 0.727 0.406 0.453 4.259 42.798+ 72.470 2.590
(0.007) (39.015) (0.023) (0.003) (0.753) (0.486) (0.620) (0.537) (0.716) (28.210) (19.217) (41.035) (42.552)
Panel B. 120 Cutoff
Whole sample 0.141** 59.0% 0.015* 0.002 -0.588 -0.837** -1.113** -1.725** -1.596** -31.653* -41.966** -70.996* -103.021* -117.785**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.015) (0.356) (0.167) (0.306) (0.303) (0.306) (9.883) (11.841) (23.459) (31.021) (30.821)
Bottom Tertiles 0.170** 65.9% 0.016+ -0.032+ 0.066 -0.961 -1.383* -1.304 -0.078 1.017 -55.275 -19.485 -85.407 -55.781
(0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (1.016) (0.620) (0.525) (0.907) (0.481) (24.318) (37.183) (25.048) (52.437) (54.190)
Middle Tertiles 0.114** 52.1% 0.028** 0.041 -0.966* -1.604** -1.922* -1.998** -2.389* -15.762 -41.007** -210.878** -143.218+ -286.214**
(0.011) (0.004) (0.024) (0.316) (0.460) (0.786) (0.567) (0.992) (9.285) (10.443) (53.569) (68.340) (45.273)
Top Tertiles 0.126** 54.1% 0.007 0.001 -0.976+ -0.179 -0.430 -1.824** -2.377** -78.171** -37.401 -36.421 -87.079+ -57.376
(0.013) (0.005) (0.017) (0.504) (0.589) (0.379) (0.493) (0.441) (14.517) (27.383) (37.758) (40.006) (37.149)
Bottom 10% 0.193** 72.0% 0.054+ -0.016 -1.338 -1.055 -0.295 -2.447 1.049 -106.111+ -101.326+ -152.164* -323.855** -150.227**
(0.042) (0.026) (0.023) (1.593) (1.311) (1.695) (2.159) (1.552) (53.900) (50.953) (52.026) (90.916) (40.204)
Notes: Each cell presents estimates of β from local linear regression of Equation (3.1). The running variable is baseline blood sugar level.
Rectangular kernel. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Notified Status on Outcomes 5 Years After Screening
Blood sugar level Mortality
After 2 years After 4 Years 5 Year
Panel A. 110 Cutoff
Whole sample 0.003 1.055** 0.080
(0.002) (0.251) (0.134)
Bottom Tertiles 0.002 0.728* -0.928
(0.006) (0.245) (0.640)
Middle Tertiles -0.002 0.566 0.023
(0.006) (0.322) (0.427)
Top Tertiles 0.010** 1.710+ 1.074**
(0.002) (0.787) (0.319)
Bottom 10% 0.015 1.586* 0.572
(0.023) (0.624) (0.329)
Panel B. 120 Cutoff
Whole sample -0.324 1.215* -0.004
(0.879) (0.424) (0.005)
Bottom Tertiles -2.421 0.634 0.002
(1.672) (0.902) (0.007)
Middle Tertiles -2.626* 3.469* -0.021+
(0.926) (1.091) (0.011)
Top Tertiles 2.770* -0.437 0.004
(0.843) (0.486) (0.007)
Bottom 10% -4.229+ 1.076 0.002
(2.103) (1.506) (0.008)
Notes: Each cell presents estimates of β from local linear regression of Equation (3.1). The running
variable is baseline blood sugar level. Rectangular kernel. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **
p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Table 3.5: Revisit Percentage by Income
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of β from local linear regression of Equation (3.1) at the 121
threshold. Column 3 is Column 2 divided by Column 1. Each row is a different income quintile. The
running variable is baseline blood sugar level. Rectangular kernel. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of Baseline Blood Sugar
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Figure 3.3: Baseline Characteristics
(a) Annual Medical Expenses
(b) Annual Hospital Days
(c) Annual Outpatient Days
Notes: The running variable is baseline blood sugar level. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable at each unit. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable
using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 5 mg/dL. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure 3.4: “Normal” Status
Notes: The running variable is baseline blood sugar level. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable at each unit. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable
using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 5 mg/dL. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure 3.5: “Risk Group” Status
Notes: The running variable is baseline blood sugar level. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable at each unit. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable
using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 5 mg/dL. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure 3.6: “Disease Suspected” Status
Notes: The running variable is baseline blood sugar level. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable at each unit. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable
using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 5 mg/dL. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure 3.7: Clinic Revisit
Notes: The running variable is baseline blood sugar level. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable at each unit. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable
using a rectangular kernel with a bandwidth of 5 mg/dL. The shaded regions are 95 percent confidence
intervals.
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Figure 3.8: Cumulative Mortality Through 5 Years After Screening
Notes: The running variable is baseline blood sugar level. The open circles plot the mean of the dependent
variable at each unit. The solid lines are fitted values from local linear regression of the dependent variable




Abadie, A. 2003. “Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models.”
Journal of Econometrics 113 (2):231–263.
Almond, D. and J.J. Doyle. 2011. “After Midnight: A Regression Discontinuity Design in Length
of Postpartum Hospital Stays.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3 (3):1–34.
Andriole, G.L., E.D. Crawford, R.L. Grubb III, S.S. Buys, D. Chia, T.R. Church, M.N. Fouad,
E.P. Gelmann, P.A. Kvale, D.J. Reding et al. 2009. “Mortality results from a randomized
prostate-cancer screening trial.” New England Journal of Medicine 360 (13):1310–1319.
Ashraf, N., J. Berry, and J.M. Shapiro. 2010. “Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence
from a Field Experiment in Zambia.” American Economic Review 100 (5):2383–2413.
Atkin, W.S., R. Edwards, I. Kralj-Hans, K. Wooldrage, A.R. Hart, J. Northover, D.M. Parkin,
J. Wardle, S.W. Duffy, J. Cuzick et al. 2010. “Once-only flexible sigmoidoscopy screening
in prevention of colorectal cancer: a multicentre randomised controlled trial.” The Lancet
375 (9726):1624–1633.
Baicker, K. and D. Goldman. 2011. “Patient Cost-Sharing and Health Care Spending Growth.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (2):47–68.
Bass, DM and LS Noelker. 1987. “The Influence of Family Caregivers on Elder Use of In-Home Ser-
vices : An Expanded Conceptual Framework.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 28 (2):184–
196.
Black, W.C., D.A. Haggstrom, and H.G. Welch. 2002. “All-cause mortality in randomized trials
of cancer screening.” Journal of the National Cancer Institute 94 (3):167–173.
Boyle, P. and B. Levin. 2008. World cancer report 2008. World Health Organization.
CBO. 2007. The Long-Term Outlook for Health Care Spending. Congressional Budget Office.
CDC. 2011. National Diabetes Fact Sheet. Centers for Disease Control.
Chandra, A., J. Gruber, and R. McKnight. 2010. “Patient cost-sharing and hospitalization offsets
in the elderly.” The American economic review 100 (1):193.
Charles, KK and P Sevak. 2005. “Can Family Caregiving Substitute for Nursing Home Care?”
Journal of Health Economics 24 (6):1174–1190.
Christianson, JB. 1988. “The Evaluation of the National Long-Term Care Demonstration .6. The
Effect of Channeling on Informal Caregiving.” Health Services Research 23 (1):99–117.
141
Cohen, J. and P. Dupas. 2010. “Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a Randomized
Malaria Prevention Experiment*.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (1):1.
Colombo, F., A. Llena-Nozal, J. Mercier, and F. Tjadens. 2011. Help Wanted? Providing and
Paying for Long-Term Care. OECD Health Policy Studies. OECD Publishing.
Cutler, David M. and Adriana Lleras-Muney. 2006. “Education and Health: Evaluating Theories
and Evidence.” Working Paper 12352, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cutler, D.M. 2008. “Are we finally winning the war on cancer?” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 22 (4):3–26.
Engelhardt, Gary V and Nadia Greenhalgh-Stanley. 2010. “Home Health Care and the Housing
and Living Arrangements of the Elderly.” Journal of Urban Economics 67 (2):226–238.
GAO. 2005. Long-Term Care Financing: Growing Demand and Cost of Services are Straining
Federal and State Budgets. U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Golberstein, E, DC Grabowski, KM Langa, and ME Chernew. 2009. “Effect of Medicare Home
Health Care Payment on Informal Care.” Inquiry 46 (1):58–71.
Goldman, D.P., G.F. Joyce, and Y. Zheng. 2007. “Prescription drug cost sharing.” Journal of the
American Medical Association 298 (1):61–69.
Gross, C.P. 2011. “Screening with low-dose computed tomography reduced lung cancer mortality
in high-risk patients.” N Engl J Med 365:395–409.
Grossman, Michael. 2006. “Education and Nonmarket Outcomes.” Elsevier, 577 – 633.
Hahn, J., P. Todd, and W. Van der Klaauw. 2001. “Identification and estimation of treatment
effects with a regression-discontinuity design.” Econometrica 69 (1):201–209.
Hsu, J., M. Price, R. Brand, G.T. Ray, B. Fireman, J.P. Newhouse, and J.V. Selby. 2006. “Cost-
Sharing for Emergency Care and Unfavorable Clinical Events: Findings from the Safety and
Financial Ramifications of ED Copayments Study.” Health Services Research 41 (5):1801–1820.
Imbens, G. and K. Kalyanaraman. 2012. “Optimal bandwidth choice for the regression disconti-
nuity estimator.” The Review of Economic Studies 79 (3):933–959.
Imbens, Guido and Karthik Kalyanaraman. 2009. “Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression
Discontinuity Estimator.” Working Paper 14726, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kadiyala, S. and E. Strumpf. 2011. “How Effective is Population-Based Cancer Screening? Re-
gression Discontinuity Estimates from the US Guideline Screening Initiation Ages.” Regression
Discontinuity Estimates from the US Guideline Screening Initiation Ages (July 1, 2011) .
Kim, J., S. Ko, and B. Yang. 2005. “The effects of patient cost sharing on ambulatory utilization
in South Korea.” Health Policy 72 (3):293–300.
Kim, Y., J.K. Jun, K.S. Choi, H.Y. Lee, E.C. Park et al. 2011. “Overview of the National Cancer
screening programme and the cancer screening status in Korea.” Asian Pac J Cancer Prev
12 (3):725–730.
142
Lange, Fabian. 2011. “The Role of Education in Complex Health Decisions: Evidence from Cancer
Screening.” Journal of Health Economics 30 (1):43–54.
Lee, David S. 2008. “Randomized Experiments from Non-Random Selection in US House Elec-
tions.” Journal of Econometrics 142 (2):675–697.
Lee, David S and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics.”
Journal of Econometric Literature 48 (2):281–355.
Lee, D.S. and D. Card. 2008. “Regression discontinuity inference with specification error.” Journal
of Econometrics 142 (2):655–674.
Lleras-Muney, A. 2005. “The Relationship Between Education and Adult Mortality in the United
States.” Review of Economic Studies 72 (1):189–221.
Lo Sasso, AT and RW Johnson. 2002. “Does Informal Care from Adult Children Reduce Nursing
Home Admissions for the Elderly?” Inquiry 39 (3):279–297.
Manning, W.G., J.P. Newhouse, N. Duan, E.B. Keeler, and A. Leibowitz. 1987. “Health insurance
and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment.” The American
Economic Review :251–277.
McKnight, R. 2006. “Home Care Reimbursement, Long-Term Care Utilization, and Health Out-
comes.” Journal of Public Economics 90 (1-2):293–323.
NCC. 2009. National Cancer Center, National Cancer Screening Survey Report (In Korean), 2009.
National Cancer Center of Korea.
NCI. 2007. Cancer Trends Progress Report 2007 Update, NIH, DHHS, Bethesda, MD,
http://progressreport.cancer.gov. National Cancer Institute.
Newhouse, Joseph P. and Rand Corporation. Insurance Experiment Group. 1993. Free for all?:
lessons from the RAND health insurance experiment. Harvard University Press.
Newhouse, J.P., W.G. Manning, C.N. Morris, L.L. Orr, N. Duan, E.B. Keeler, A. Leibowitz, K.H.
Marquis, M.S. Marquis, C.E. Phelps et al. 1981. “Some interim results from a controlled trial
of cost sharing in health insurance.” New England Journal of Medicine 305 (25):1501–1507.
NHS. 2008. NHS Breast Screening Programme Annual Review. NHS Breast Screening Programme.
Oken, M.M., W.G. Hocking, P.A. Kvale, G.L. Andriole, S.S. Buys, T.R. Church, E.D. Crawford,
M.N. Fouad, C. Isaacs, D.J. Reding et al. 2011. “Screening by chest radiograph and lung cancer
mortality.” JAMA: the journal of the American Medical Association 306 (17):1865–1873.
Orsini, Chiara. 2010. “Changing the Way the Elderly Live: Evidence from the Home Health care
Market in the United States.” Journal of Public Economics 94 (1-2):142–152.
Pezzin, LE, P Kemper, and J Reschovsky. 1996. “Does Publicly Provided Home Care Substitute
for Family Care? Experimental Evidence with Endogenous Living Arrangements.” Journal of
Human Resources 31 (3):650–676.
143
Schopper, D. and C. de Wolf. 2009. “How effective are breast cancer screening programmes by
mammography? Review of the current evidence.” European journal of cancer 45 (11):1916–1923.
Schro¨der, F.H., J. Hugosson, M.J. Roobol, T.L.J. Tammela, S. Ciatto, V. Nelen, M. Kwiatkowski,
M. Lujan, H. Lilja, M. Zappa et al. 2009. “Screening and prostate-cancer mortality in a ran-
domized European study.” New England Journal of Medicine 360 (13):1320–1328.
Shampanier, K., N. Mazar, and D. Ariely. 2007. “Zero as a special price: The true value of free
products.” Marketing Science 26 (6):742–757.
Soldo, BJ. 1985. “In-Home Services for the Dependent Elderly: Determinants of Current Use and
Implications for Future Demand.” Research on Aging 7 (2):281–304.
Stabile, Mark, Audrey Laporte, and Peter C. Coyte. 2006. “Household Responses to Public Home
Care Programs.” Journal of Health Economics 25 (4):674–701.
Swartz, K. 2010. “Cost-sharing: effects on spending and outcomes.” The Synthesis project.
Research synthesis report (20).
Urquiola, Miguel and Eric Verhoogen. 2009. “Class-Size Caps, Sorting, and the Regression-
Discontinuity Design.” American Economic Review 99 (1):179–215.
USPSTF. 2008. “Screening for Prostate Cancer: US Preventive Services Task Force Recommen-
dation Statement.” Annals of Internal Medicine 149 (3):185–191.
Van Houtven, CH and EC Norton. 2004. “Informal Care and Health Care Use of Older Adults.”
Journal of Health Economics 23 (6):1159–1180.
Ward, Derek, Amy Drahota, Diane Gal, Martin Severs, and Taraneh P. Dean. 2008. “Care Home
Versus Hospital and Own Home Environments for Rehabilitation of Older People.” Cochrane
Database of Systematic Reviews (4).
Wennberg, J.E. and M.M. Cooper. 1996. The Dartmouth atlas of health care. American Hospital
Publishing.
Wolinsky, FD, RR Mosely, and RM Coe. 1986. “A Cohort Analysis of the Use of Health Services
by Elderly Americans.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 27 (3):209–219.
Wooldridge, J and J Schore. 1988. “The Evaluation of the National Long-Term Care Demonstra-
tion .7. The Effect of Channeling on the Use of Nursing Homes, Hospitals, and Other Medical
Services.” Health Services Research 23 (1):119–127.
Zauber, A.G., S.J. Winawer, M.J. O’Brien, I. Lansdorp-Vogelaar, M. van Ballegooijen, B.F. Han-
key, W. Shi, J.H. Bond, M. Schapiro, J.F. Panish et al. 2012. “Colonoscopic Polypectomy





Table A.1: The Price of Cancer Screening
Unit($)
Year 2002 2003 2004
Administrarion cost 3.70 3.81 4.16
Stomach cancer screening
UGI 33.34 34.13 34.88
EGD 33.30 34.28 35.20
Biopsy 20.73 24.16 24.81
Breast cancer screening
Mammography 12.50 18.31 18.76
Biopsy 24.02 29.70 30.50
145
Table A.2: Smoothness around Cutoff




Height (Cm) Obesity (Round 1) BMI (Round 1)status screening (R1)
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.25) 0.3 IK(0.25) 0.3 IK (0.23) 0.3 IK(0.11) 0.3 IK(0.13) 0.3 IK(0.11)
-0.4545* -0.3793 0.0191 0.0157 0.0007 0.0093 -0.0232 0.0486 0.0012 0.0143** -0.0344 0.0635*
(0.211) (0.238) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.084) (0.126) (0.007) (0.002) (0.048) (0.020)




Height (Cm) Obesity (Round 1) BMI (Round 1)status screening (R1)
Bandwidth 0.3 IK(0.25) 0.3 IK(0.25) 0.3 IK (0.09) 0.3 IK(0.15) 0.3 IK(0.12) 0.3 IK(0.12)
-0.2994 -0.0799 0.0042 -0.0188 0.0534** 0.0329 -0.0903+ -0.0280 0.0096* 0.0056 0.0605* 0.0354+
(0.180) (0.170) (0.025) (0.022) (0.015) (0.024) (0.044) (0.064) (0.004) (0.004) (0.027) (0.016)
N 1,396,081 1,178,589 1,396,081 1,178,589 1,396,081 445,477 408,967 206,229 408,623 137,755 408,623 137,755
Note: Each cell represents a coefficient β from different local linear regression of equation (1.1). The running variable is the standardized insurance contribution. Rectangular kernel is
used. Robust standard errors clustered at standardized insurance contribution in parentheses. **, * and + indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Figure A.1: Density of Insurance Contribution
Panel A. Histogram, Male
Panel B. Histogram, Female
Note: In each panel histogram with smallest bin size and 0.05 are presented
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Figure A.2: Probability of Cancer Screening Take up by Health Status
Panel A. BMI
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Panel B. Blood sugar level
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Panel C. Total Cholesterol
Stomach cancer, Male Stomach cancer, Female Breast cancer, Female
Note: Each figure shows probability of general screening take up in the second round by BMI, blood sugar and cholesterol level in the first round. Normal range of BMI is between
18.5 and 25. Normal level of blood sugar is under 110, and DM is diagnosed if it is greater than 120. Normal level of total cholesterol is under 200, and hyperlipidemia is diagnosed if
it is over 240.
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Figure A.3: Probability of General Health Screening Take up by Health Status
Panel A. BMI, Male Panel B. BMI, Female
Panel C. Blood sugar, Male Panel D. Blood sugar, Female
Panel E. Total Cholesterol, Male Panel F. Total Cholesterol, Female
Note: Each figure shows probability of general health screening take up in the second round by BMI, blood sugar and cholesterol level
in the first round. Normal range of BMI is between 18.5 and 25. Normal level of blood sugar is under 110, and DM is diagnosed if it is




The preliminary score is calculated from the responses to 52 questions in the eligibility evaluation.
A list of these items and possible responses are listed in Table B.1.
The procedure for determining the preliminary score is as follows:
1. Convert responses to point values, according to Table B.1.
2. Sum the points in each category.
3. Based on the category scores and the responses to the 52 items, determine sub-scores for
eight service categories: individual hygiene, excretion support, eating, moving, behavior,
indirect support, nursing care, and rehabilitation. See Figure B.1 for an illustration of how
the eating sub-score is determined.
4. Sum the service sub-scores to arrive at the preliminary score.
We now provide a partial example for calculating the preliminary score. Table B.2 contains
a sample set of answers to the eligibility assessment. The category scores for ADL and REH are
16 and 13, respectively. Now follow the eating tree. The first fork depends on the response to
“eating” in the ADL category. The response of independent (1) sends us along the left branch.
The response to ”brushing teeth” is independent (1), which takes us down the first branch. Since
the ADL score is 16, we end up along the right branch for a score of 9.4. We repeat this procedure
for the remaining service sub-scores:
• Individual hygiene 5.3
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• Nursing Care 9.7
• Rehabilitation 2.7
These sum to the final score of 55.8.
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Table B.1: Assessment Questions
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Table B.2: Sample Assessment
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Figure B.1: Eating Tree
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Table B.3: Description of Reimbursed LTC Services
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Figure B.2: Density of Scores, 2009 vs. April 2008
(a) (b)
Notes: Preliminary scores in 1 point bins. “All 2009” consists of the preliminary scores from assessments in 2009. “April 2008” consists of the
preliminary scores from assessments in April 2008.
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Figure B.3: Score Sensitivity Example
Notes: Sample of individuals whose preliminary scores fall between 45 and 105, with the response “Fully
Independent” to the item “Changing Position”. The original preliminary score is on the x-axis. The new
preliminary score after changing the response from “Fully Independent” to “Needs Partial Support” is on
the y-axis. Also graphed in red is the 45 degree line.
